Regional Governance of the Capital Metropolitan Region: A Comparative Study of Berlin-Brandenburg and Beijing

As the motor of a globalized economy, the development of metropolises requires more effective and suitable regional governance. Global competition appears at city, regional, national and supranational levels, and therefore governance activities are changing correspondingly at these multi-levels. Brenner thought that these different scales construct the ‘superimposed, interdependent forms of territorial organization’, and they are equally important without a dominating scale (Brenner N, 2007). This paper reviews the cases of Berlin-Brandenburg and Beijing metropolitan regions which provide two different kinds of views to observe the complicated multi-level regional governance and its potential effects. By using the comparative study method and from the ‘metropolitan region’ and ‘city’ levels, the organizational status quo and development trends of regional governance and regional cooperation in Berlin-Brandenburg and Beijing metropolitan regions are explored. The regional development and administrative characteristics of these two capital regions are expatiated on different politics, societies and economic backgrounds. The reference significance of Berlin-Brandenburg to the regional governance of Beijing metropolitan region is indicated.

Regional Governance and Regional Cooperation at the Metropolitan Region Level

Regional cooperation in ‘mono-centric’ metropolitan region of Berlin-Brandenburg is realized mainly through a regional joint planning department. Based on this, a stable regional governance system is established. As the third economic development polar of China, the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei metropolitan region is a ‘polycentric’ urban area composed by ten cities. Since the regional cooperation and dialogue are just started in this area, regional governance and coordinated development need to be realized step by step by stages under appropriate guidance.

Berlin-Brandenburg Metropolitan Region: Regional Governance of a Mono-centric City-region

In federal state Germany, the government is composed by three levels which are the federation, the state and the local. Just like America, the right of federal government of Germany is relatively weak. The federal government intervenes the local development mainly through national laws, financial support and other ways, while local government has the powerful autonomous right to make decisions for local affairs. Being an urban state of Germany, Berlin has a population of about 3.4 million and an area of 889 square kilometers. However, in a wide area of 29,000 square kilometers of Brandenburg State which is closely surrounding Berlin, there are only about 2.55 million people. With Berlin as the core, these closely connected and differentially developed two states form into one metropolitan area with a total area of 30,000 square kilometers and the population of about 6 million. (Fig.1, Fig.2). High density of urban space in Berlin, and large area of agriculture and scattered settlements in Brandenburg demonstrate the great disparities in economy, structure and geography between the central city and its hinterland.
The failure of Germany in the Second World War caused long time isolation of the East and West Berlin with its hinterland Brandenburg State in economy and administration. Since the reunification of Germany in 1990, social and economic communications and population flow between the new capital Berlin and Brandenburg State became very frequent. Nevertheless, the administrative borderline of these two states continually segregated the nuclear city from its suburbs. Different administrative territories made it impossible to manage the population and occupation transitions and the requirement of service facilities crossing the state boundaries. Therefore, the state governments started to promote the merging event of these two states since 1991. However, the referendum held in 1996 doomed the end of ‘Merging Act’ which cost 7 million Deutsche Mark. Although the benefits for the proposed merging were obvious, for example, the two states require mutual complementarities and resource integration to overcome their own disadvantages and structural contradictions; the administrative management outlay can be largely saved; the competitiveness of the city-region can be improved in Europe or national economic system, most citizens voted against this act except the supports from two state governments and some other organizations. The objection voices were mainly from Brandenburg State, and the failure of this referendum was ascribed to psychological shadow of citizens caused by long term splitting and continued east and west characteristics to a large extent. Since Berlin has always been the ruler in the region, people from Brandenburg were afraid that they would have to sacrifice their own interests to the benefits of Berlin after the merging. The ‘hostile emotion’ makes Brandenburg do not want to cooperate with Berlin, maintain the inner area which is immediately connected with Berlin only as greenbelt, and allow Berlin to expand its right beyond its administrative boundary for its own benefits (Hauswirth Iris, 2003; Herrschel Tassilo, 2002, 2004; Salet Willem, 2003).
Although the ideal for the merging of these two regions by administrative revolution was failed, the economic motivity for regional collaboration is still existed. The official inter-state planning and cooperative mechanism, ‘Berlin-Brandenburg Joint Spatial Planning Department’ was established in Potsdam in 1996. This planning department is unique in Germany. As a component both of ‘Senate Urban Development Department’ of Berlin and ‘Infrastructure and Regional Planning Department’ of Brandenburg, the joint department has direct political right to make and execute planning decisions in federal state level. Guided by the objectives of ‘equitable distribution of development opportunities and potentials, promoting the development of both states, enhancing the mutual economic space, strengthening the regional competitiveness in Europe, preserving the natural foundations of life, realizing the desired spatial structure of both states in the merging procedure of Europe’, main tasks of the Joint Spatial Planning Department are making ‘State Development Plan and Program’ for both states, determining the development guideline for sub-region, and reviewing relevant development projects to guarantee their consistency with the objectives of spatial planning (Fig. 3). After almost ten years of discussion between these two states, one of the important regional decisions made by the Joint Spatial Planning Department is to construct a new high-standard international airport at the outskirts of Berlin jointly to improve the international accessibility of the entire metropolitan region.

Figure 3 The newest planning system of Berlin-Brandenburg Joint Spatial Planning Department
Berlin-Brandenburg Joint Spatial Planning Department: Report file, 07

Besides the formal regional planning and regional cooperative institution, informal tools, especially the forums which promote the public participation and the dialogue among all social sectors, are also the valuable methods to enhance communication, strengthen mutual understandings and construct cooperative trust. There are more than ten dialogue platforms in Berlin-Brandenburg
metropolitan region working as such kind of informal tools, such as respective ‘City (State) Forum’ of Berlin and Brandenburg, four ‘Neighborhood Forum’ of east, south, west and north established between local authorities at the borders of both states, and ‘Self-Help Development Plan’ of exurb of Brandenburg. These forums play an important role in promoting the cooperation among two states at different levels.

However, the complicated issue of regional governance can not be well organized only by Berlin-Brandenburg Joint Spatial Planning Department. How to set up harmonious regional cooperative and competitive systems and how to deal with the complex relationships between vertical and horizontal administrative sectors are still big challenges bothered both states. Berlin has 12 relatively independent urban districts, while Brandenburg has five regions, and each region has hundreds of independent municipals. Therefore, joint planning works involve numerous actors and objects which require coordination, such as scholars, public, enterprisers, and administrative staff of the state, regional or local governments. Moreover, the emphasis of equality means that decisions have to be made on the basis of the agreement of both states, which slows down the decision-making speed and strategy responses. The potential differences in political and economic benefits of both state governments, made some scholars think that this department more or less likes a Talk Show and the joint department is lacking of rigid legal rights to implement its policies, which makes all states modify the agreements according to their own benefits in practice (Herrschel Tassilo, 2002, 2004). The joint planning system has another weakness in that there is no formal or informal cooperative mechanism in other technical departments of the state government paralleled with the Joint Spatial Planning Department. Consequently, the Joint Planning Department is only used as a limited tool for planning management. In the joint agendas of economic development, tourism and scientific research of both states, the development objectives of regional master plan are not paid with the same attention. As revealed by international experience, inter-regional cooperation is always existing in the relatively ‘weak’ and ‘soft’ fields such as public relations and planning (Heinz W, 2000).

**Metropolitan Region of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei: Regional Governance of a Polycentric City-region**

China is a unitary state. Almost the whole country is implementing a same law system and same national policies. Administration in China is relatively concentrated, which is mainly exhibited in that the central government is very powerful with a large number of political and administrative institutions and specialized management responsibilities. If necessary, the central government can interfere with local affairs directly. As a rule, authorities at the high-level nominate lower-level officials, and the People's Congress ratifies their nomination. The organization of China's local authorities is consistent with that of the central authorities. This is considered to guarantee a high degree of consistency of policy directions. A local department is not only responsible to the local authority, but also to the same organs at higher levels. For example, a city-planning department is ‘controlled’ by the local mayor, though similarly by the provincial or national city planning departments above. Consequently, the politico-administrative framework in the P.R. of China is characterized by a high degree of horizontal and vertical fragmentation, which provides a great deal of space and opportunity for political and administrative maneuvering (Xiang Junbo, 2005). Except special administrative regions, the Constitution regulates that China adopts the four-level
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The incredible development of east coastal areas of China created three major metropolitan regions of Pearl River Delta, Yangtze River Delta and Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei successively. In 2006, the State Council announced that the New Coastal Area of Tianjin as the National Reform-testing District by ‘Opinions about Promoting the Development and Opening of New Coastal Area of Tianjin’. The same year, Tianjin was positioned as the “Northern Economic Center” according to ‘the State Council’s Approval on Master Plan of Tianjin (2005-2020)’. Since then, Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei metropolitan region was highlighted by the media, administration and academia. Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei is a mega city-region which includes two directly-controlled municipalities (a city with the same status as province) of Beijing and Tianjin, and Tangshan, Baoding, Langfang, Qinhuangdao, Cangzhou, Zhangjiakou, Chengde and Shijiazhuang of Hebei Province. It has a land area of 185,000 square kilometers with a population of about 70 million in 2004. It is a multi-center metropolitan region with Beijing and Tianjin as the dominating cores (Fig. 4). The population scales of Beijing, Tianjin and Baoding are more than 10 million, of Cangzhou, Shijiazhuang and Tangshan are more than 5 million, and of the smallest cities such as Zhangjiakou, Langfang and Chengde are still between 2 to 4 million. However, the polycentric structure of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei metropolitan region is only manifested in geographical locations. The functional polycentric structure with reasonable labor and market divisions is far from forming. Contrary to coordinated regional development, competitions among cities in the metropolitan area are becoming fiercer. Although, Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei area has been regarded as an integral geographical unit and many regional development researches were conducted since the 1980s,
discussions on the integrating development of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei has never stopped in 1990s (Wu Liangyong, 2004), and the circulation of capital, population, materials and other elements among cities within the metropolitan region are dramatically frequent in 2000s (Fig. 5), administrative barriers and many other politics, history and economy factors make the real regional combination and cooperation of still in starting stage.

Since 1949, as the capital of new China and due to the political advantages, Beijing has always been the leader of the region. Beijing is not only the center of northern China, but also the center of the whole country. The development priorities and the supports of national policies and funds make Beijing unquestionably become the ‘Head’ of the entire Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei metropolitan region. As one of the cities firstly affected by globalization in this region, the cooperative desire of Beijing with its surrounding hinterland is more and more urgent. On one side, this is the direct requirement of Beijing to raise its position in world city network by combining regional strengths; on the other hand, along with the suburbanization trend and city expansion, Beijing is restricted more and more by administrative boundaries in resources, markets and space. Moreover, many important problems connected with city development, such as ecological protection and infrastructure construction, should be solved in a wider geographical territory beyond administrative boundaries. For example, in northeastern, Beijing needs to enhance its cooperation with upstream city of Zhangjiakou in Hebei Province in order to maintain their common ecological environment and gain more water sources from upstream area; in southwestern, Beijing looks forward to cooperate with Tianjin and shares the large-scale regional infrastructures with it. In this way, Beijing could construct the second Capital Airport on the developing corridor of Beijing-Tianjin, and strengthen its accessibility in international trading system by utilizing the seaport resource of Tianjin. At the same time, Beijing also wishes to establish market access mechanism without administrative barriers with Tianjin and Hebei, and expand its market of labor and raw materials and of manufactured products and consumption through joint constructing of the opening regional economy.

The commuting between Tianjin, the second-class city in the metropolitan area, and Beijing is only 1 hour. Because of the nearly identical industrial structure between Tianjin and Beijing (Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research, CAS, 2007), it is no doubt that Tianjin views Beijing as the strongest ‘enemy’ and competitor. To prevent Beijing from occupying all resources in their mutual hinterland as its own, Tianjin has always protected carefully its administrative autonomy as well as natural, geographical, social and economic resources. Therefore, Tianjin does not have much enthusiasm in sharing its port resource with Beijing and does not want its advantage elements to flow into Beijing due to this kind of regional resource-sharing. Compared to the proposal provided by Beijing on constructing a new international airport together, maybe the strategy to improve the grade of Tianjin Airport will benefit Tianjin itself more.

As the widest and immediate hinterland of Beijing and Tianjin, Hebei is one of the biggest resource provinces and heavy industrial provinces in China. Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan Power Network is the most important power sources of Beijing and Tianjin (Institute of Architectural and Urban Studies of Tsinghua University, 2004). But compared with the development degree of Beijing and Tianjin,
Hebei falls far behind. Therefore, Hebei province seems to be ‘the shadow under the sun’. Now Tangshan, Baoding, and other cities of Hebei have frequent communications with Beijing and Tianjin, and they are all looking forward to share more economic radiations from the two leading cities through regional cooperation.

‘Economic globalization is closely connected with regional integration in all levels. In order to achieve higher positions in global competition system, strengthening the cooperation within the region becomes the initiative request of the organizations of political power and economic development agencies (Zhang Jingxiang, 2004)’. Therefore, since the new century, especially after 2004, regional competition in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei metropolitan region becomes increasingly fiercer and so does the cooperative desires for cooperation among cities (province). To achieve regional cooperation, various kinds of forums, joint conferences, regional researches, cooperative agreements, etc. are organized or issued. Dialogues among cities are first happened in the fields of joint construction of traffic infrastructures, economic cooperation, utilization and compensation of water resource, joint development of tourism, and urban planning and construction. These fully indicate the urgency and future potential for promotion of regional cooperation in these fields. The regional dialogue platform even expands to the Bohai Economic Circle including provinces of Liaoning, Shanxi, Shandong and Mongolia. Government departments, relevant scholars, representatives from business circles and foreign countries are participated in these dialogues. Cities (province) which once only care about their own development, now are attempting to open their doors to each other on the basis of bilateral benefit, equality and mutual assistance. Cooperative trust and cognizance are gradually established among them, which can be seen from the ‘Utilization and Compensation Mechanism of Water Resource’ agreed by Beijing and Hebei, ‘9+10 Regional Tourism Cooperative Agreement’ with Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei as the core, the construction of more city expressways between Beijing and Tianjin, and the ‘Cooperation and Development Forum of Bohai Economic Circle’ and so on. Although these inspiring regional cooperative activities are far from realizing the true meaning substantial cooperation, these manifest that Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei metropolitan region makes a great step towards the establishment of new urban network and regional relationship. Mr. Wu Liangyong thought that ‘Although the coordinated development of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei has stepped to ‘practice’ from ‘theory’, the way to practice can not be achieved overnight. It should be realized step by step by stages. Without doubt, the ‘regional’ development perspective and strategies are the inevitable way for Beijing-Tianjing-Hebei metropolitan region to improve comprehensive competitiveness and to step into the world city system (Wu Liangyong, 2004)’.

**Regional Governance and Cooperative Intention at City Level**

At city level, Berlin has already established the mainly centralized and properly scattered administrative system. The cooperative relation and up-down connection has been formed between the state and 12 urban districts. But in Beijing, the competitions among the 8 well-developed central districts are very fierce, which worsens the damage of old city and environmental pollution. Moreover, there are obvious disparities between 10 suburban districts (counties) at the periphery of the city and the 8 central districts. Although to establish balanced multi-centre urban system in the whole Beijing region has been put forward as a development objective in the new ‘2003 strategic Plan of Beijing’ and ‘2004 Beijing Master Plan’, detailed
implementation approach is still under investigation.

**Berlin: Polycentric Urban Management**

Berlin is a multi-culture metropolitan. Besides the administrative organizations of parliament, government department, etc., the highest association of Germany economic circle, and more than a thousand economic, scientific, medical, social and cultural institutes are located in Berlin. Many embassies and representative offices of federal states construct lots of office buildings in Berlin. Originally, Berlin was divided into 23 districts (Bezirke). To reduce the coordination conflicts caused by too many scattered regimes, the administrative reform in 2001 united these 23 districts into 12 districts, and each district was divided into sub-district (Stadtteile). So the multi-centre management structure was formed (Fig 6). At present, the 12 districts of Berlin have 96 local governments in total and each local government is composed by several streets (Kiez). These 12 districts have independent district parliaments (Bezirksamts), five district councilors (Bezirksstadträte) and one district mayor (Bezirksbürgermeister). But districts of Berlin are not independent local regimes because the power of the district government is limited and they are subordinated to the senate of Berlin. District mayors from all districts compose the district mayor parliament with the mayor of Berlin as the leader and provide opinions to the senate of Berlin.

Therefore, the centralized and properly scattered administrative system is basically shaped in Berlin, which can be described as: state government is responsible for establishing overall development principles and objectives for the entire urban state and managing important construction projects closely related to the general development of the city; all districts of the city are responsible for making detailed plans and managing specific constructions within their jurisdiction, and are guided and supervised by the state government. 12 districts of Berlin do not have independent self economic sources because all capitals required for the development of these districts are distributed by the state government in a unified way. This kind of system weakens the potential competition among all districts of the city for attracting investments and increasing revenue.

Furthermore, the establishment of ‘urban network’ with the participation of members from all fields of the society is an important measure for the promotion of urban governance in Berlin. The regularly held ‘Berlin Forum’ provides a stable platform for the public to participate in the urban issues.

However, after Berlin was determined as the new Capital of new Germany, the city did not develop in an explosive way as expected. On the contrary, financial support by the federal government to this region is gradually reduced, while the damaged economic basis during the war is urgent to be
remodeled. In the competition with the other 10 international metropolitan regions in Germany, Berlin does not have obvious advantages. Thus international investments and cooperate headquarters do not have much interests in this region as predicted. Because of the lacking of economic development incentives and capitals, the multi-centre urban structure of Berlin does not guarantee a completed balanced development. There are differences between the East and West Berlin and between central urban districts and marginal urban districts. The seemingly perfect administrative system appears to endow the state government with too many rights. The state government can directly interfere with local construction if necessary, and the concentration of management power is hereby enhanced. In addition, with the purposes of creating the image of district and improving the quality of the urban area, new types of competitions among these districts are emerging. At the same time, the pressure caused by economic competition from surrounding local autonomous communities of Brandenburg is not weakening. Therefore, dialogue, understanding and cooperation among all the districts should be further improved.

Beijing: Polycentric Development of Central and Suburban Urban Districts

Beijing has an area of 16,800 square kilometers, a total population of about 15 million, and 16 districts and 2 counties. Eight districts of Dongcheng, Xicheng, Xuanwu, Chongwen, Haidian, Chaoyang, Shijingshan and Fengtai are the ‘city of Beijing’. Total population of these eight districts was 8.7 million in 2003. The other ten districts and counties at the periphery are outskirts hinterland of the Beijing city. All the 18 districts and counties are centrally managed by the city government of Beijing. As the capital, Beijing is full of development momentum: the gigantic ‘politics’ industry formed by the location of central and local administrative organizations; plenty of headquarters of international corporations attracted by the image of capital CBD (Central Business District); the rapid development of cultural industry promoted by the Olympic Games, CCTV Headquarter, National Grand Theatre, and other large scale facilities and events; the social transformation pushed by universities, IT, advanced automobile manufacturing, and other knowledge-based industries; the enhancing of attraction to international capitals and talents for the largest international airport in the region and so on. The direct results brought by all of these are the booming of population, the flourishing of urban real estate industry, and the continuous expanding of urban construction.

Since the 90s of last century, Beijing city (8 central districts) has adapted an urban space development mode of ‘ring + radiation’ which focuses the old city as the center. The second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth ring roads surrounding the old city have been gradually constructed. This mono-centric spatial pattern made population, industry, business trade, and traffic highly concentrate in the eight central districts. When the city center is developed with overload, the other ten districts and counties at the periphery with wide areas are lagged far behind. Their economic development level, quality of infrastructures, living convenience, etc. can not compare with the city center indeed. It is no doubt that the great gap between the city and the suburb hinterland is restricting the further development of Beijing. Through a more scattered multi-centre urban system, the pressure on the inner city could be relieved, and the development of the entire region including the hinterland could be brought along. Thus, polycentric spatial structure becomes an important development strategy for Beijing. Since 2003, after the making of ‘Strategic Planning of Beijing’ and ‘Beijing Master Plan’ successively, the spatial strategy of ‘two axes, two corridors and
multi-centers’ has been gradually triggered off in Beijing (Fig 8). The strategy puts forward that the development of city center should emphasize on the east-west and south-north urban axes determined by the coordinate of old city; two corridors (one green corridor on the west, one development corridor on the east) should be set up at both sides of the Beijing city; eleven multi-centers which mean 11 new towns should be developed along these two corridors, and three of them are defined as most important development cores. Although the new urban strategy aims to break up the former single-center pattern of Beijing and establish a new polycentric urban system, whether this conception can be achieved in the future and how to achieve are still not known. Obviously, the implementation of this strategy requires the overall cooperation between the city government and district and county governments.

Similar to Berlin, the administrative system of Beijing is composed of centralized city government and decentralized district and county governments. The divisions of responsibilities between city government and district and county governments, and among different governmental departments have always been the focus issue of political power. Simply speaking, the reform of administrative power system in Beijing has been through a tortuous development process of ‘centralization – decentralization – centralization’. The bidirectional process of power decentralization and power retrieval coexists in these three different periods. For example, for a long time after the foundation of P.R.China, the power of city government of Beijing was highly concentrated. District and county governments were almost completely resigned to the instructions of the city government. After that period, in order to stimulate the development vitality of economy, the city government handed over many decision-making and management rights of local businesses to district and county governments. The reform trend towards decentralization was very obvious. However, in recent years, in order to strengthen its own authority and guarantee city policies to be consistently implemented within the whole region, the city government of Beijing adopted a series of ‘centralization’ measures. For instance, at the early stage of 21 century, Beijing started a large scale political movement of ‘transforming county into urban district’ to further enhance the function
of city government in urban management; the original planning bureaus of all districts and counties were merged into Beijing Municipal Commission of Urban Planning, and thus become branch bureaus of urban planning department of city government. The city government of Beijing tries to strengthen its authority of urban planning and management in this way (Xiang Junbo, 2005). At present, the city government plays a decisive role in urban construction process. Under the guidance of the city government, district and county governments implement self-management within their jurisdiction. Therefore, the communication and cooperation among districts and counties mainly depend on the promotion and organization of the city government.

Specific to the city of Beijing (8 central districts), the economic competitions among districts on attracting foreign investment, land lease and development of real estate are very strong. Various kinds of current administrative institutions aggravate these virulent competition behaviors rather than restrain them. For example, the Government Performance Evaluating System which uses the amount of ‘investment attraction’ and other economic development indexes as the core estimating standards, makes all the district governments try all means to develop their economy, head for short term economic benefits, and ignore the environment protection, conservation of historical and cultural heritages and other sustainable issues. Another example, after hand in necessary revenue, all urban districts can keep part of the income obtained from the local development due to the Tax Allocation System between districts (counties) and the city government. This undoubtedly stimulates the strong desire of districts to develop local economy and participate in the virulent competition. Under these circumstances, the dialogue and cooperation among all urban districts are few, while the phenomena of mutual comparing or slandering are happening from time to time.

Figure 9 Multi-center structure of the city of Beijing
Source: China Academy of Urban Planning and Design (2008). Monographic Study on New Costal Area of Tianjin

However, through many years of guided development, the functional polycentric structure of the city of Beijing has been preliminarily formed (Fig.9). Certain spatial concentration and division of political, economic and cultural functions are realized in the 8 central districts, for example, the Electronic High Technology Science Park in Haidian District, the Olympic Park and CBD in
Chaoyang District, and the Financial Street in Xicheng District. This provides good conditions for strengthening the district identities, further diverse development, and weakening homogeneous competition.

Conclusions

Both as capital metropolitan regions of large countries, although Berlin-Brandenburg and Beijing are in different development stages, they are both confronted with problems like how to enhance regional cooperation, improve regional competitiveness, protect regional ecological resources, and upgrade the position in the world city system. The study of Berlin-Brandenburg case will provide experience reference on establishing of regional governance system at ‘metropolitan region’ and ‘city’ level for Beijing. The practical regional governance of Berlin-Brandenburg shows that the mega-city of Beijing should pay attention to the following things during the process to promote regional integration and regional cooperation.

From the perspective of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei metropolitan region, in order to promote more specific and effective regional cooperation, dialogues among all fields, all levels and all social roles should be further strengthened at first. Well-organized and regularly negotiated regional communication and cooperation mechanism will be gradually established. Secondly, formal and informal regional cooperative systems should be equally treated. To establish these systems always requires the initiation and promotion of the governments and the participation of all actors of the society. Thus the social cooperative network composed by government officials, experts, scholars, enterprisers, technicians, property owners and common public will be found. Thirdly, regional cooperation in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei should be started from the fields of ecological conservation, joint construction of traffic facilities and infrastructure, joint development of tourism, and molding uniform market which are easy to breakthrough. On the basis of equal negotiation, the long-term development orientation, objective and emphasis should be gradually nailed down. And the regional development strategies, policies and their implementation methods of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei metropolitan area should be initiated step by step.

From the perspective of Beijing municipal, conflicts of economic benefits lead to fierce competition among all urban districts (counties) and cause many negative problems. Through proper adjustment of the division of administrative power, or reform of the administrative system, the competition can be weakened and the cooperation may be promoted. For example, further division of vertical and horizontal powers among different levels of governments can reduce disputes and conflicts. Regulating financial distribution and compensation mechanism between the city government and district (county) governments can lessen self interests-based development. In addition, to realize polycentric urban system requires correct support and guidance of the government and a large amount of fund, otherwise the ‘balanced regional development’ is only a meaningless slogan. And through continuous strengthening of dialogues and cooperation among all districts (counties) of Beijing, the ideal to promote functional polycentric structure with reasonable labor division in the whole region might be achieved.

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