

Urban reconstruction in a contested landscape – lessons from Cato Manor in South Africa

by

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Introduction – the Cato Manor project

During the 1950s the informal settlements of Cato Manor housed a population of approximately 150 000 people. Following the promulgation of the Group Areas Act in 1955, the entire population was resettled to formal townships on the metropolitan fringe. Despite being one of the most accessible areas in the Durban metropolitan region, only five kms from the city centre, this 2000 ha site remained largely unoccupied until the late 1980s.

With the political changes in South Africa, in the early 1990s, a renewed interest in the redevelopment of Cato Manor led to the establishment of a multi-party negotiating forum to create a policy framework for the re-development of Cato Manor. This led to the formation of the Cato Manor Development Association (CMDA), a Section 21 company, to act as the vehicle for the delivery of the Project as set out in the policy framework. The CMDA was registered in 1993 and attained a full-time staff capacity in 1994. It was headed by a Board of directors, which set and reviewed policy, and by a CEO and management team, who were responsible for implementing the policies and reporting progress to the Board.

In 1995 the Project was designated as a Presidential Lead Project of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and received a significant tranche of funding. In 1997 the Project received a further major injection of funds from the European Union (EU) as part of its Programme for Reconstruction and Development in South Africa.

The key strategic objectives of the Project were as follows: "to create an efficient and productive 'city within a city', targeting mainly the poor and marginalized residents of greater Durban; to provide housing and security of tenure; to reduce prevailing infrastructure and service disparities; and to establish safe and secure living and working environments with ample economic opportunities." These objectives were to be achieved through the delivery of an integrated, area based, development project whose key foci were the delivery of housing; social, educational and recreational infrastructure; land reform; local economic development and human skills development. The Project aimed to produce 25 000 housing units (accommodating 150 000 people) and the creation of 25 000 permanent jobs." (Cato Manor Development Project Status Report, 2000)

The Cato Manor Development Project (CMDP) is the largest and most advanced Presidential Project in South Africa. Following the establishment of the CMDA as an implementation vehicle in 1993, the project unfolded rapidly, albeit not always according to plan. From a situation of intense conflict and political stand-off between

just a few thousand informal settlers in the early 1990s, today Cato Manor has a population of some 80 000 people and is en route to becoming one of the better served areas of Durban in terms of social and community facilities. As such it is a good example of a successful “area based” project and one from which many lessons can be gleaned for other urban renewal projects in South Africa and elsewhere in the developing world. In 2002, the CMDP was awarded the UN HABITAT/Dubai Award as an international “best practice” project in sustainable urban development; and the prestigious South African Impumelelo Award in the housing and urban development category. A summary of project statistics is included as an Annexure.

Learning from experience

Last year a documentation process was undertaken involving researchers and professionals representing some twenty separate academic and applied disciplines, revealed many insights and lessons. The authors of a soon to be published book on this research commented that “... to our knowledge, such a degree of multi-disciplinarity has not been marshalled around the theme of urban reconstruction before.” (Robinson, McCarthy & Forster, 2003; 1)

The aims of this paper are to extract from the Cato Manor experience some themes on urban reconstruction that appear to have global relevance and will be of particular interest to planners working in developing areas of the world; to reflect on the international relevance of the Cato Manor experience; and to identify some critical success factors for future large-scale urban reconstruction projects.

Some universal themes – issues and questions

The following themes have been selected for presentation in this paper:

1. Urban development in a contested landscape
2. Symbols of hope after a change in government
3. Making progress in a shifting institutional and political environment
4. Ways of achieving integrated development
5. Institutional delivery structures and business models
6. Partnerships in urban development
7. Sources of funding and investment
8. Land issues
9. Pre-conditions for delivery at scale
10. Community participation
11. Leadership and team work – turning problems into solutions
12. Long-term sustainability and area based management.
13. Innovation and replication

As time and space preclude a full discussion of these themes emphasis will be on issues and questions in the hope that this will stimulate debate in the Workshop.

1. **Urban development in a contested landscape** (Robinson, McCarthy & Forster, 2003; chapter 1)

The concept of political conflict interwoven with efforts at urban reconstruction is hardly new to urban studies, or to South Africa, as shown in David Harvey’s essays on the history of conflicts over urban reconstruction in Paris and a recent special issue of the journal Urban Studies (Vol. 39, No. 9, 2002), which is specifically devoted to engaging with this issue in contemporary Asian cities.

What have been some of the more important themes from this literature that resonate with the Cato Manor experience?

- David Harvey's work on Paris, as well as the Cato Manor experience, remind us of the critical importance of social class issues, and the politics of class and ethnic symbolism in urban reconstruction.
- Studies of urban redevelopment for the poor in Malaysia, Thailand, Burma and South Korea amongst others, serve as reminders of the probability that the politicised destruction, and then reconstruction, of Cato Manor could be seen as part of a wider pattern of colonial and neo-colonial urban conflicts and progressive responses to them.

Reflecting upon what has been happening even since the publication of this Urban Studies volume, for example in Baghdad or in the towns of Palestine, the research and policy agenda is presumably (hopefully) now rapidly moving to, not so much towards noting the obvious parallels of colonial and neo-colonial dominance and destruction associated with Cato Manor's past, but also possibly towards the more positive lessons associated with the more recent history of urban reconstruction.

Who will re-reticulate electricity to Baghdad's suburbs and how; who will make more or less effectively donor oil funds committed to Baghdad's reconstruction and how; how will disrupted urban services like sewage be provided and through which processes; how will this interface with the militant youth of Baghdad and/or fractured community groups perspectives; etc?

These are all questions that were faced, in one way or another, in Cato Manor (and with a not inconsiderable degree of success). In an era of globalisation of knowledge and also developmental best practice, is it too much to hope that the hard-learned lessons derived from Cato Manor may be of some relevance here; is it also too much to hope that similar lessons might be fruitfully applied to the reconstruction of many of the devastated urban settlements in Palestine, as the road map for peace is mapped out and independent statehood emerges there?

2. Symbols of hope after a change of government

With the collapse of apartheid in South Africa, Cato Manor re-emerged as a centre of symbolic hope - a place in which it was hoped that one could build 'a city within a city', an integrated community which reversed the divisive social and developmental legacy of urban apartheid, and which offered residential and economic opportunities to especially the urban poor.

With the arrival of the era of democratisation in South Africa, Cato Manor came to reflect some of the new challenges of urban development management in the post-apartheid period. A central feature of this period has been the (national) tension between the heightened material expectations of the newly enfranchised, and the need for the state to make the most efficient and equitable use of the resources at its disposal for developmental purposes.

Given these circumstances the choice of the Cato Manor area for central government and donor agency involvement was sensible at two levels: First, the area made sense within the context of the overall project objective related to the provision of services to the poor; and, second, as a contribution towards urban re-integration and the realisation of post-apartheid spatial planning goals, it could hardly have been better placed.

3. Making progress in a shifting institutional and political environment

The first ten years of Cato Manor's redevelopment (1990 to 2000) took place amid a continually changing political and institutional environment. During the early years, the

old apartheid government was crumbling but the new government had yet to get established. This created both a policy vacuum and an institutional void, in which government officials from national down to local levels were either disinclined to take any decisions, or were uncertain what to do in advance of formulation of new policies. At the time of this major transformation government exercised little authority in the area and there was, initially, lack of support for a coherent plan for the development of the area. In addition there were land claims (dating back to the era of forced removals) on land that was targeted for development.

As the new government became established during the mid and late 1990s, and progressively developed a series of policies for urban development, and as the local authority in metropolitan Durban slowly emerged as an effective entity, the policy environment started to firm up. In a number of instances policies were initiated and tested in Cato Manor, prior to wider adoption. Examples include policies for the allocation of residential sites and housing; revised space standards for schools, libraries, community halls, sports fields and clinics.

While the shifting institutional and political environment posed numerous constraints on the project, at the same time it created opportunities to try out new and innovative approaches to urban development. In what has been described as “planning on the run” (Owen, 2003) the CMDA adopted a long-term vision and a Policy Framework for the development of Cato Manor (GCMDF 1992;) and used this as a strategic focus around which to re-adjust as events on the ground, or changes in the policy environment dictated.

4. Ways of achieving integrated development

From the outset, an explicit objective was to reconstruct Cato Manor in an integrated way. This was to have several dimensions: to integrate Cato Manor into metropolitan Durban; to integrate its various precincts despite the hilly terrain; to integrate land uses and activities within each precinct; to integrate social and economic development with the development of land, physical infrastructure and housing; and so on.

How one best achieves integrated development is an important debating point. There are different senses of “integration” and multi-disciplinary teams do not guarantee integrated outcomes. One of the main tools for achieving integration was the strategic Policy Framework; another was spatial planning (Ferguson, Masson and Odendaal, 2003). Social and economic development is increasingly viewed as fundamentally inter-related with increased emphasis of cross-cutting issues. But these often fall between departmental responsibilities and therefore tend to be neglected or dealt with in a partial manner, for example:

- Poverty
- Public health and HIV/AIDS
- Gender
- Public safety
- Natural environment.

A related issue is the question of the sequence in which different types of projects should be implemented. It has been argued that the “soft” issues, such as capacity building, human and local economic development and crime prevention, were not given enough attention during the early years of the Cato Manor project. By about 1997, once the pre-conditions for delivery at scale had been established (see below), there was a discernable shift, with additional emphasis being given to human and social aspects, many of these projects being undertaken with EU funding.

In retrospect, there appears to be a logical progression from investment in “hard” projects first, to secure the main elements of the public infrastructure, followed by community and economic development projects, with the timing varying depending on the conditions at the outset. There may be advantages in separating, the delivery of soft projects and hard, bulk infrastructure between different institutional vehicles, as the scale and focus is so vastly different, and totally different consultation processes are needed.

5. Institutional delivery structures and business models

The design of an appropriate institutional delivery vehicle and sustainable institutional arrangements will always be dictated to some extent by policies of the prevailing local authority. In the case of Cato Manor in the early 1990s, CMDA was set up as a Section 21 (not for gain) company and was positioned as an entity external to the public sector and funders. Under the circumstances, the organisation was effective in delivering a range of goods and services in accordance with its mandate. However, this was not without tensions regarding the degree of autonomy the CMDA enjoyed and the extent it was perceived by the public sector and funders to be accountable, nor without problems regarding community representation in its structures. (Nell & Charlton, 2003; Zulu, 2003)

This would suggest the challenge is one of building institutional structures which are either:

- special purpose vehicles built around partnerships, or
- area based management structures within local government (focused on delivery, rather than maintenance).

An important question is how to “identify the institutional and organisational conditions needed to empower a development agent to effectively deliver public goods and services.” (Nell & Charlton, 2003) Nell and Charlton argue that “a separate, focussed organisation has the key advantages in delivering urban development”. The issue is not whether an organisation “should be a state corporate, non-governmental, or a private company, but rather whether it optimizes its position in terms of the five dimensions of governance, authority, compliance, competence and relationships.

- Governance refers to how the organisation makes decisions, how it oversees its obligations, how it guides management (internal accountability);
- Authority refers to the way in which an organisation is empowered to act, whether by virtue of law, founding documents or mandates given;
- Compliance refers to the external accountability of the organisation – how it meets the obligations of its contractual relations to third parties such as spheres of government, land owners, funders, etc;
- Competence refers to how the organisation is able to deploy resources and deliver; the skills it has which enables it to deliver and its legal ability to assemble and mobilise resources (people, technical support systems and facilities);
- Relationships refer to the way the organisation interacts with a variety of stakeholders, authorities and funders (institutional arrangements).” (Nell & Charlton, 2003)

As far as a business model is concerned, the strategic choices made by the local authority, and the policy environment it creates for development agencies, once again set parameters. CMDA’s intended model was to plan, facilitate, strategise but only undertake the physical development as a last resort. In reality, however, CMDA was forced to play a bigger role - that of facilitator, co-ordinator and developer, undertaking the planning, packaging and preparation of projects, which were then contracted out. These functions and the range of projects determined the staff organization, the type and level of skills required. It also draws attention to a variety of partnership arrangements in which CMDA engaged.

6. Partnerships in urban development

In the Cato Manor Development Project partnerships were forged in relation to local necessities, as urban development partnerships often are. While the South African policy environment for such partnerships “was cautious during the 1990s, international experience was more positive at that time and influenced, for example, the European Union’s approach to the CMDP.” (McCarthy, 2003)

Outside of the developing world there are considerable lessons that can be learnt from international experience on development partnerships. Clark and Evans’ (1998) assessment of the private sector perspective upon the costs and benefits of urban development partnerships is perhaps the most helpful published to date, in terms of its provision of an empirical basis upon which to classify variable private sector expectations of such partnerships.

Partnerships in urban development for the private sector entail the normal effort to maximize returns on investment whilst minimizing risks; and it is the assessment of such risks that is the particular preoccupation of the private sector in respect of such partnerships. Clark and Evans show for example that both the risks and returns to private investment in urban infrastructure are higher than in most other forms of investment (e.g. property, equity), and that the costs and benefits of private management of such projects can vary significantly according to the type of investment.

For example, a tolled bridge for a road involves both low management autonomy and low management intensity, whereas provision of a private hospital offers both high management autonomy but also high management intensity (management autonomy obviously helps to reduce risks, but management intensity increases variable costs and often reduces net returns).

From the public sector’s perspective too, there are complex methodological issues relating to the returns on their investments in partnerships or joint ventures. Indeed, the fact that an entire issue of the journal *Urban Studies* (Vol. 34 No. 12, 1997) should have been devoted to studies of the methodological and negotiating issues entailed in urban development and financing partnerships, indicates something of the maturity of the debate that has since been reached in Britain and in the United States, amongst other countries. In South Africa, urban development or redevelopment partnerships are still relatively immature in relation to such concepts, although one might expect that during the next decade that this will change. In the meantime experiences in First World countries are continuing to advance, and how these can be best fed into developing world experiences remains to be seen.

7. Sources of funding and investment

The reconstruction initiative in Cato Manor started out with virtually no funding (during the time of the Forum). In the year during which the CMDA was established a grant was secured to cover operating costs for a year and a loan for more detailed planning. The following year further grants and bridging funding was obtained. It was only in 1995 that the first major tranche of funding was secured (from the government’s Reconstruction and Development Programme), followed in 1997 by a larger tranche from the European Union.

Key issues and questions relating to sources of funding and investment include:

- How best to use external, donor funding which is a major catalyst, not only in financial terms but also in terms of knowledge, experience and quality control;
- How large tranches of funding for an integrated set of projects has multiple advantages;

- How there is a tendency for state/local government funding to come from line function departments – and the implications this has;
- Why funding should be directly to development agencies which have established track records and confidence of the funding agency;
- Why conventional private investment may be tentative depending on the perceived risk of the area and its history; and why we may therefore need partnerships and “ice-breaking” initiatives (as in the use of EU funds for local economic development projects in Cato Manor);
- How household and small entrepreneur level private investment also plays a significant role over time.

The Cato Manor Development Programme also has some potentially important implications for donor funding, internationally. Amongst these are:

- The importance of large-scale, area-based interventions in terms of making policy impacts
- The need to choose sectoral and locational foci which are both consistent with democratically determined local policy priorities, and internationally derived perspectives on efficient and equitable development
- The value of supporting (certain types of) pre-existing NGOs
- The benefits of assisting and adding value to national policy initiatives. (EU Mid-term Review, 2000)

8. Land issues

The fundamental land issues in urban reconstruction relate to acquisition of the land; securing rights to develop it; protection of the land and rights during planning and development; allocation of rights to end users; and long-term management of land use and changes in use. In Cato Manor, pooling of the land was part of the negotiated agreement that established the Forum. The key strategic decision taken by the CMDA was not to take ownership of the land, but rather to plan, develop and allocate it to end-users, as agent of the landowner (National Housing Board and local government). The critical mechanisms were the land availability and agency agreements.

CMDA had more success in land development and allocation, than in protection (in the early periods 88 ha or 11% of the developable area was lost to land invasions). Land claims threatened to block the whole project in 1996-97. The outcome of a drawn out conflict resolution process was a complex accommodation between national land restitution objectives and national urban redevelopment objectives. As a result, most of the claims have now been settled.

9. Pre-conditions for delivery at scale

Urban development projects typically evolve through three broad, overlapping stages:

- a planning stage to establish the pre-conditions for development and lay the foundations for delivery;
- a public investment stage to develop the physical and social infrastructure; and
- a private investment and capital formation stage.

In Cato Manor there were intense settlement pressures from the outset, and these were exacerbated by the land invasions in 1993 and 1995, which transformed the project from a mainly green fields development to one that needed to accommodate about 30 000 people who had occupied parts of the land in informal settlements. These fragile, refugee communities were plagued by crime and violence, which at one time threatened to stop the

entire project. In due course, stability was restored and levels of crime and violence decreased.

On the basis of experiences in Cato Manor, certain pre-conditions need to be established before delivery “at scale” can commence:

- Plans and policies formulated, with technical and social support?
- Land assembled, statutory and legal constraints cleared?
- Public investment mobilized and directed to project objectives?
- Stability, law and order secured?
- Working relations between institutions established, roles clarified, trust secured?
- Human resources marshalled and human resource development programmes instituted?

10. Community participation

The need for there to be community participation in urban development is widely accepted. However, implementation of this objective is more problematic. Community participation had always been a central element of the Cato Manor project. The model initially adopted was one that had been used successfully in other areas with similar, large informal settlements. However, the community dynamics of the time, coupled with weak and vulnerable community structures, rendered the approach unworkable. This forced the CMDA to devise a different, less politicised, and more developmental model for community participation. Recent evidence indicates that it is proving more successful in matching participation of different stakeholder groups to their capabilities to respond, and capacity to contribute to particular issues.

In practice, a huge variation in approaches to community participation is likely depending on the political tradition of the country or city. Then there are issues pertaining to learning networks, for example, sharing knowledge of best practices and on the job training. Cato Manor has provided one set of examples on how to do this, but there must be many others. What lessons will emerge nationally on these? How will they compare to international lessons?

11. Leadership and team work – turning problems into solutions

Contemporary business literature emphasises the highly significant role that leadership plays in the success, or otherwise, of any organisation. Leadership may be regarded as the “glue” which held the Cato Manor project together through some turbulent times. Assessments by business management specialists drew attention to the “remarkable adaptability of the CMDA under rapidly changing conditions”, the role of the leaders as problem solvers; and goal focussed team work. (McGibbon, 2003) In a paper entitled “Thriving on chaos – planning on the run” Owen argued that an important key to CMDA’s practical success under near impossible environmental circumstances lay in its implicit adoption of four management principles that have internationally been proven to be the basis for successful corporate governance world-wide. These are:

- to select people who have talent;
- to clarify each staff member’s role in the project;
- to motivate staff by concentrating on their strengths; and
- to allow people to grow and use their talents where they are best suited in the organisation. (Owen, 2003)

However, McGibbon noted, “it takes time to build capacity in an organisation and mould it into an efficient, goal focussed team. In the case of CMDA it took six years.” Herein lie lessons for future urban reconstruction projects.

12. Long-term sustainability and area based management

A key residual issue for all such projects however will clearly be that of maintenance and sustainability, after the winding up of such projects. Options here include:

- Transfer of responsibility to local government
- Urban management generally is organised increasingly on area based basis for targeted urban reconstruction areas
- There is a combination of local government units, outsourcing (conventional arrangements but with increasing emphasis on smaller scale operators – a version of partnerships; and community-local government partnerships)
- There is a closer match between nature of the maintenance function and type/scale of operator. A key challenge here is to devise affordable and cost-effective ways of maintaining infrastructure and services. Also there is the need to enhance the value and use of infrastructure and services; and to ensure multipliers from investment in human resource development, training and capacity building.

13. Innovation and replication

Finally there is the challenge of innovation. Replicating best practices is not enough. Innovation is necessary in order for new best practices to emerge. What do we know of innovation? Innovation and pilot projects can pave the way for later replication. But individuals and organisations need time and space to be innovative, and organisations need to be prepared to take the increased risks associated with innovation. Innovation of course also derives from crises and pressure, but then time and “space” are again needed to test out the options that result in innovation. Are we providing such spaces at present? If not, why not? How do we ensure that they will open up in new ways in the future?

International relevance

The Cato Manor Project is apparently a unique one in terms of international development aid experience. This, of course, means that it is difficult to find a benchmark against which to measure relative international success. Nevertheless, all indicators are that - at least at the level of African urban development management experience - it has been very successful to date. Indeed, many now regard it as a role model. This much has been achieved despite an extremely complex local socio-political environment, and a local history that has been fraught with community bitterness and tensions.

What are the main reasons for this success? There are several, but amongst them the following, extracted from the Report of the Mid-term Review Panel for European Union funding should surely be included:

- “A large international funder with a consistent record, made the major difference between this probably being a marginal, beleaguered project, versus the major success story that it has become.
- The nature of the project, in terms of its sectoral foci, its location, its chosen target groups, and its intervention logic was not only consistent with local, democratically-determined policy perspectives; but was also congruent with internationally-derived perspectives on efficient and equitable patterns of urban development.
- The project supported an already existing development NGO that had limited capacity, but strong vision, expertise and legitimacy, and good working relationships with democratically-elected authorities.
- The project supported important areas of development initiative by national and

local government, and did not seek to replace them; and it then extended and elaborated upon such initiatives, quietly bringing the best of international experience to bear in 'adding value' to the process.

- The success of the project is closely related to the fact that it supported and enhanced a system of urban development management that was:
 - socially inclusive in terms of its governance structures,
 - expertise-centred in terms of its management systems,
 - in terms of timing, beyond a planning phase, and starting into a delivery phase,
 - cost efficient, since it was managed with financial and accounting rigour, yet was also enterprising in outlook.” (EU Mid Term Review Report, 2000)

Conclusions – critical success factors

In the final analysis, the most fundamental lessons from the Cato Manor Development Project are that success in urban reconstruction, particularly in developing areas, depends on getting a combination of factors to work in concert. First is leadership and commitment to last the course, without which no project can succeed. Second, and closely linked, is the ability to solve problems “on the run”, to continually find ways of making progress in unstable and shifting environments. Third is understanding the political, social and economic dynamics that surround and influence the project. Fourth is structuring and institutional positioning of the development agency in such a way that it has the necessary autonomy and authority to deliver effectively. Associated with this is to anchor the project as firmly as possible within established organs of state, so as to achieve a sufficient degree of social stability, law and order – pre-conditions for delivering development.

Sixth is to forge a series of partnerships, which may be overlapping at times. A network of such partnerships protects a project from being unduly dominated, or undermined by one or other stakeholder. A seventh factor is to focus on area based delivery over a protracted time. In Cato Manor, the ability to concentrate a significant amount of resources (human and financial) in the area for some ten years, contributed largely to its achievements to date. Finally, even though most urban reconstruction projects require early attention to physical infrastructure, equal attention needs to be devoted to social and economic development initiatives, for after all, it is the citizens, as end users, who seek reconstruction and development.

Unless these critical success factors are in place, the well established urban planning, engineering, architectural design, programme and project management techniques that are associated with complex, large-scale urban development projects world-wide, cannot be applied to good effect.

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Annexure – Range of projects and output indicators (2003)

Type of project / investment	Indicators
Financial investment	
- Public sector & donor investment	R 348 m
- Private sector (housing) investment	R 45 m
- Public sector & donor commitment	R 514 m
Engineering infrastructure	
- Arterial bus and mini-bus routes	25 kms
- Bulk infrastructure projects	30
Housing projects	
- Informal settlement upgrading projects (to be completed by 2004)	2152 (2360)
- Greenfields incremental projects (to be completed by 2004)	2287 (1548)
- Credit linked housing (to be completed by 2004)	806 (578)
- Social housing (to be completed by 2004)	332 (2242)
Social infrastructure projects	
- Community Health Centre	1
- Community halls	3
- Fruit trees to home owners	1
- Libraries	3
- Pre-schools	10
- Primary schools	6
- Secondary schools	3
- Parks	9

- Playgrounds	3
- Play “spots”	11
- Sports fields	5
Local economic development projects	
- Production spaces/units	65
- Co-operatives started	16
- Local businesses supported	220
- Traders market facilities	106
- Retail centre (business premises)	44
- Job placements	1515
- Industrial/commercial land dev. (net sq m)	132 870
- Office/retail/service floor area developed	5118
Human resource development projects	
- Life skills (literacy, numeracy)	191
- Life skills (home ownership education)	4500
- Life skills (organisational development)	158
- Economic skills (Pre-school teachers)	170
- Economic skills (pre-school management)	36
- Economic skills (industrial skills)	176
- Economic skills (co-operatives)	893
- Economic skills (urban agriculture)	165
- Economic skills (business management)	230
- Economic skills (construction)	197
- Economic skills (craft production)	40
- Econ. skills (security enterprises/guards)	210
- Economic skills (tour guides)	7
- Econ. skills (radio program production)	16

Sources: Cato Manor (2002), IZWI (2003)