**Insecurity in Nairobi. Towards a “glocal” perspective**

**Short Lead**
This paper explores the linkages between globalization and urban insecurity through the Nairobi case study and open a transnational perspective on urban insecurity through the introduction of an Italian case study. Looking at cities as both places of economic valuation and social devaluation, it gives rise to a reflection about how to defend urban diversity when security privatisation, social exclusion and extremely-organized cultures of violence emerge as transnationally-shared urban issues.

**Urban insecurity and globalization**
The issue of urban security must be looked at with caution. It is a social issue that permanently oscillates between political over-abuses and extreme social anxious and, as a result, between crime and welfare, transnational migrations and social intolerance, religious fundamentalism and preventive wars, progressive and conservative trends. In reality, globalization seems to go hand in hand with urban insecurity. On one hand, the planetary *institutionalization* of the Market exasperates the center-periphery linkage by drawing new geographies of fear and marginality instead of the proposed global well-being network; on the other hand, progressive *individualization* destabilizes the modern society and expose it to a *de-traditionalization* involving both private and public dimensions of human life: family, gender and inter-generation relationships, institutions. Urban insecurity materializes the risk of such elements as perceived social change: each socio-cultural context metabolizes global inputs at the *local* level, perceives reality through its own symbols and culture, expresses itself through its own fears.

Both in developed and developing countries, globalization compresses the different social experiences by making the perceived “loss of stability” a permanent condition of living. If we persist in perceiving globalization “as a structural force operating behind people’s backs and inexorably determining their futures”, cities are destined to be considered the places where the distortions induced by economic development both explode visibly and regenerate themselves secretly while the urban security approach remains that of *crime prevention*. On the other hand, if we start to consider it an “unfinished product of politically and culturally constructed social practices”, cities emerge as the “crossroads of social relations constituted by the interactions of local, national and transnational flows” where “each “self” exists in specific communication circuits more complex and mobile than before”, and urban security consolidation can be seen as a multidimensional and permanent process of *strengthening and consolidation* of informal self-organized or potential social forms through incremental social learning processes aiming at “interactive knowledge”, namely action knowledge where distinction between professional and local knowledge disappears, allowing urban identities to regenerate themselves autonomously: urban insecurity calls for an integrated social risk management.

This paper presents the results of the internship carried out at Safer Cities Programme/UN-HABITAT in Nairobi (Kenya) as fieldwork of the Master “Urban and Regional Planning in Developing Countries” at the Regional Planning Faculty of University of Architecture of Venice (IUAV). The first part introduces the source of knowledge, victimization surveys - one of the crime assessment tools of Safer Cities Programme - and shows the results of the Nairobi one; the second part shows the Nairobi case study as the first endeavor, in the framework of Safer Cities Programme, to turn an inherited crime preventive approach into an urban management one; finally, the third part evidences the added value arising from this case study and opens a transnational perspective through an Italian case study.

**Nairobi Victimization Survey: from microcriminality to structural violence**
Victimization surveys are surveys on representative population samples, to collect data on personal and household victimization through the categorization of crimes against person and property. Their objectives are: (a) to develop detailed information about victims and consequences of crime; (b) to estimate the number and types of crime not reported to the
police; (c) to provide uniform measures of selected types of crimes; (d) to permit comparisons over time and type of areas. “Crime in Nairobi: results of a citywide victim survey (2001)” is the Nairobi victim survey conducted in the framework of the Safer Nairobi Project arising from the agreement between Nairobi City Council and Safer Cities Programme and managed by the School of Development Studies at the University of Natal (South Africa).

Throughout the study of over 10,500 ordinary residents of Nairobi, the victim survey raises the following four main points about crime and crime control in Nairobi:

- Perception levels of urban violence and corruption are very high;
- Crime perception and rates of victimization do not correspond;
- A social paralysis and institutional distrust limits the collective ability to participate in crime reduction initiatives;
- Lobbying for support of crime prevention initiatives should be prioritized on government’s agenda.

According to such conclusions, it has to be acknowledged that urban insecurity in Nairobi is not only linked to objective micro-criminality but is structural, namely, permeates political, economic and social macro-levels, and policy environment, including cultural norms of the society. Conversely, to consolidate urban security in Nairobi implies providing an input to a social learning process by:

- Understanding Kenyan civil society cultural background;
- Locating urban change in Nairobi;
- Extrapolating its dynamics and dimensions so that a social learning process can be initiated.

The Kenyan “transitional seesaw”

During the last 40 years since the end of English colonialism in 1963, Kenya has been experiencing the sharp contrast between post-independence ambitions and their real evolution: Kenya was permeated by the spirit of uhuru, namely freedom in Swahili, and that of ujama, the skill of self-government in the 60’s while it became the country of kitu kidogo, the tip, and the cheating political violence of the Arap Moi “regime” in the 90’s. The complex job of building of a nation was devastated by both global and local factors.

With reference to the former, the huge foreign donor aid made all the contradictions of trickle down politics – namely the idea that economic growth can reach the poor drop by drop – emerge, while the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), intended as protection measures – by supporting the liberalization of commerce with high interest rates, the liberalization of financial markets without regulation, privatization without paying attention to the abuse of monopolistic powers, and the fiscal austerity blindly followed – led to the too young Kenyan soul being knocked down. It has been shown that the SAPs caused inflation in Kenya to increase significantly: from 15.8 % in 1990 to 19.6 % in 1991 and 27. 5 % in 1992 and, moreover, the month-by-month rate of inflation in Kenya was recorded at 32.4% in January 1993, rising to 41.9% in February.

With reference to local factors, after the multipartitism law in 1991, Kenyan civil society has been experiencing a permanent transition without transformation, a “transition seesaw” between global mode (the western) and ethnical claims. These two modes of transition seem to be inversely related: democratic gains in the ‘civic’ sphere of authority (whose transition is guided by the global modes) are clawed back by political processes in the ‘ethno-traditional’ sphere: this alternate back-and-forth motion on the "transformation continuum" explains why the transformative ‘content’ inherent in the process "spirits away" long before it can translate into any meaningful change. However, three cycles can be identified:

- Cycle I – the retreat of civil society (1988-1992)

Civil society supported political opposition up to the formation of political parties while the regime was establishing – thanks to constitutional reforms aimed at taking away the self-government of legal powers and to the KANU Youth Wing, a pro-governmental vigilantes group utilized to break up opposition meetings – a social atmosphere of insecurity such
as to force civil society into abandoning the process of transition just before the election defeat.

**Cycle II – the Labor division of civil society (1993-1998)**

Civil society participated actively and implemented a sort of Labor division. On one hand, donors, religious groups and Democracy and Governance (DG), consisting of human rights groups, emerged from the previous informal formation; on the other hand, two new sectors joined them. First, the “market” sector, namely labor movements representing sections of the middle class in Kenya, became engaged in confrontations with the regime; then, the “green formations”, slum dwellers and small-scale marketers in the rural and urban frontiers of civil society fighting for human rights. To such diversified social forces corresponds the lack of coordination between the three souls of political opposition – namely, FORD Kenya, FORD Asily, Democratic Part (DP) – while the regime, by relying on opposition weakness, promoting the ethnicization of the political debate and practicing electoral bribery, again kept presidential power.

**Cycle III – the end of the Moi ‘regime’ (1999-2002)**

Three main sectors emerged from the civil society. First, the “green formations” were at the forefront in the struggle for human rights; secondly, the “market” sector continued to be involved actively in the political debate; thirdly, the fusion between the church, other religious groups such as Muslim or Hindu, and some sectors of DG created “Ufungamano Constitution-making initiatives”; moreover, the DG sector aimed at checking governmental powers in municipal society. At the same time, the Rainbow Coalition emerged as integration between the three different souls of the opposition and offered a compact opposition to the old regime.

With the Rainbow Coalition victory, a new phase could be opened under the banner of the Kenyan soul of the *unbowgable*, namely “incorruptible” in a fusion between English and Swahili, and the first non-violent elections held. Nowadays, post-Moi Kenya has to undertake a new path of endogenous development by facing the regional imbalance that makes Nairobi the place where all its contradictions explode: the urban primacy and the structural violence within a new-brand atmosphere of latent international stigmatization resulting from the recent Islamic terrorism attacks in Nairobi and Mombasa.

**“Primate Nairobi”: capital valuation, social devaluation**

The Kenyan urban population has passed from 19.7% in 1985 to 31.8% in 2000, although the average growth rate has been reduced from 8.06 in 1980-85 to 6.72 in 1995-200019. Given that primacy is not a matter of absolute quantities but a feature of national systems, despite the reduction in urban growth rate, trends suggest that primacy and connection with the region are priorities in terms of urban development policies.

The primacy of Nairobi, capital of Kenya, has continued from 1920 to the present: governmental programs did not succeed in contrasting market forces that overwhelmingly favor the concentration of social and economic activities. Nowadays, what occurs is the intensification of primacy features rather than a more balanced urban system as modernization had proposed. From the 1999 Census, the population for Nairobi is 2,143,254 while Mombasa 665,018, Kisumu 504,359 Eldoret 197,449 and Nyeri 661,156: figures that exemplify this primacy20. As a result, Nairobi acts as a magnet and concentrates an excessive share of population and PNL. Within almost a century, the city has experienced very rapid urbanization, passing from 8,000 inhabitants in 1901 to 827,775 in 1979 and 2,137,000 in 199921; at the same time, for instance, in 1976, Nairobi produced 20.0% of the national income compared to 30.3% overall of urban areas22. Conversely, high rates of urbanization do not go hand in hand with similar forms of endogenous development but lead to urban disconnection and devaluation of marginal socio-cultural contexts: a dizzy increase in social exclusion, urban violence, informal settlements. For instance, from 1971 to 1995, the portion of people living in informal settlements has passed from 1/3 of the whole population to 60%, inhabiting 5% of the residential land23; at the same time, there is a dramatic incidence of urban poverty, violent crime and mob justice.
in the informal settlements. Opposed to these figures, exactly because of Nairobi magnetism, a positive feedback can be acknowledged in the approaching interaction between different socio-cultural groups destabilizing progressively the racial segregation of western Nairobi.

“Western Nairobi” and racial segregation

In 1896, Enkare Nairobi, meaning “a place of cold waters”, was the Maasai name chosen by the Kenya Uganda Railway (KUR) authorities for a suitable stopping place between Mombasa and Kisumu. In 1900, after a site was selected on the high ground on the northern side of the Nairobi river and away from the railway station to be the administrative headquarters, regulations published by the Government of Kenya (GOK) defined Nairobi urban center as “the area within a radius of one and a half miles from the office of the sub-commissioner of the Ukambani Province”. In reality, just after the location of a maintenance depot, spatial patterns around it and the railway station emerged: the urban framework was racial segregation, a colonialist practice that prevailed as late as the early 1960’s. Segregation along racial lines divided the city into four distinct sectors: North and East defined the Asian Sector (Parklands, Pangani and Eastleigh); East and the South East defined the African Sector (Pumwani, Kariokor, Doonholm); South-East to South marked another small Asian enclave before it was bounded by the Game Park (Nairobi South, Nairobi West); finally, the line north and west marked the European area, roughly divided by the farming community in Karen-Langata region and the British aristocracy and administration officers. These areas grew around the productive sector of the city which “developed as its hub, slowly acquiring an appendage commonly known as the industrial area”. Racial segregation was the urban paradigm in the major plans of 1905, 1927 and 1948. After the non-implementation of the 1973 Nairobi Metropolitan Growth Strategy, the 1948 Master Plan is still the only comprehensive plan for the city: the issue of segregation had not been addressed but rather seemed to have been condoned. The result of the colonial racial residential planning was an extremely unequal land distribution: for Africans, both under the colonial regime and after independence in 1963, the availability of land was and still is severely restricted. Furthermore, the patterns of land distribution have followed the segregation in the colonial period, but now they are based upon socio-economic factors. As a consequence, the colonial racial residential planning has resulted in low population densities in high-income areas (former European areas) and the highest densities in the low income areas (African areas) of Eastlands, Kasarani, Karioiari, Kibera and others. For example, in 1972, there were eight inhabitants per acre in the ex-European zone, 32 in the Asian zone and 400 in the African zone. Again, in the period between 1979 and 1985, high income households accounted for less than 10% of Nairobi’s households, yet they were allocated 64% of all residential land in Nairobi. This was almost halved to 37% over the period 1985-2000. As a result, land ownership was distributed as follows: 80% of residential land is occupied by only 20% of the population while the remaining population is crowded into 20%. Moreover, the skewed land distribution has translated into about 60% of Nairobi’s population currently occupying only 5% of the above 20% residential land through informal housing developments. If racial polarization has turned into socio-economic polarization, spatial competition emerges and risks leading to urban disintegration when spatial borders are crossed but socio-economic ones are accentuated.
“Glocal Nairobi”: global-local contamination and urban change
Nairobi is experiencing contamination between two different social experiences.
On one hand, western Nairobi expands from south to north along the main arterial road, Uhuru highway, linking the main municipal and international infrastructures: the industrial area, the airport, the Game Park, the Central Business District, the network of casinos and commercial centers, the United Nations and the new American Embassy. On the other hand, Nairobi is crossed from the western side to the eastern by the pervasive development of informal settlements: the major ones such as Mathare, Kibera, Waithaka, Korogocho are still growing, while each village (administrative unit) in Nairobi is experiencing ever more informal citywide sprawl.
The contamination between such processes is producing growing insecurity and social anxiety over an urban change perceived as imposed. Sex-ratio, age, employment and crime are the variables explaining social dynamics into the following four villages clusters:

**Cluster 1 (female prevalence, generational and social diversity, low crime victimization)**
Stable urban contexts appear to be shaped by female presence: women represent 59.1% of cluster population, higher than any other cluster, and equally distributed in each age category within this cluster. On one hand, housewives, young male and female students, formal employment and the lowest rates of crime show a stable urban picture. On the other hand, a new trend is emerging. First, the loss of young men (17-35 years) suggests a mild migration trend; secondly, the percentage of women living alone is higher than in any other cluster, making them, above all the elderly, a vulnerable social group; thirdly, spatial patterns seem to be ever more shaped by the current progressive growth of both owners and squatters.

**Cluster 2 (female prevalence, generational diversity, gender role evolution, violent-victimized women)**
There is an high female presence although the prevalence remains male. On one hand, women are stably represented into each age category while there is a male gap in the 17-35 year group, broader than in the former cluster. Family appears a strong presence but with a clear evolutionary trend: housewives are prevalent but the proportion of informally employed is higher than in other clusters. It may be meaningful that women, above all informally employed, are highly violent-victimized, although crime incidence is low.

**Cluster 3 (male prevalence, generational homogeneity, unemployment and informal employment, high victimization)**
Insecure contexts are shaped by progressive loss of social links and generational homogeneity although women maintain a domestic cohesive role. On one hand, male population is very young (17-25 and 26-35 age categories are prevalent) and a strong correlation is reported between the highest male presence, the highest presence of 17-25 years old men as well as the highest presence of men living alone of all the clusters; on the other hand, women are mainly young (26-35 years old) and live with the family. Unemployment, informal employment and high levels of violent and property crime accentuate social vulnerability within these contexts by involving both men and women without distinction.

**Cluster 4 (male prevalence, generational homogeneity, formal and informal employment, very high victimization)**
Loss of social links and generational homogeneity are greater than in the previous cluster. On one hand, male presence is very high while both men and women are consistently represented only in the 25-35 age category; on the other hand, the incidence of women living alone is higher than in the previous cluster. The highest levels of crime of all the clusters, levels of unemployment lower than the previous cluster and the high presence of both of formal and informal employment give an extreme and contradictory picture of urban insecurity.
The forementioned social dynamics evidence the urban change and suggest new trends in patterns of urbanization. First, the eastern side of the city expanding from the first African settlement near the industrial area to the suburban areas of Mugumoini. These lands can be considered as spaces competed for by public infrastructure allocation, building speculation of private individuals who have erected illegal structures leading to a shortage of land for public developments, and informal settlements development. On the other hand, they are welcome lands to young rural-urban migrants where processes of socio-economic self-diversification are present, while recruiting by local mafias can cause self-destruction and socio-economic standstill. Furthermore, they are suffering from permanent forms of stigmatization, forcing this part of the city into a social marginality but not functional to the 'western' city.

Secondly, the western side of the city concerning the traditional residential European area, the sprawl of informal settlements and the freehold lands, namely land privately owned either by individuals or by groups of individuals that can be put on the market for sale without limits to the period of ownership. Spatial junctions and extreme socio-economic distances occur: informal settlements do not halt at the borderlines of high value lands but cause ever more fragmented polarizations within them. This nearing produces contradictory processes of cultural assimilation leading to weakly shared communication codes, and extreme expressions of urban violence.

Thirdly, the northern side of the city, namely the expansion of high-income social groups in suburban areas. Gated communities, very low density settlements and international institutions stimulate the creation of a city disconnected locally but connected globally through and around its shared institutions and all the services supporting them. The United Nations and the new American Embassy have started a
progressive trend of abandoning the Central Business District by other international institutions and have contributed to the creation of a transnational space that does not acknowledge the “other city” but lives on its subordination. To sum up, a new geography of fear and marginality as well as extreme social exclusion and power emerges, resulting in Nairobi being assaulted by a growing, multidimensional insecurity: to focus on its specific dimensions would appear the way to lay the foundations for a social learning process, namely for the urban management of insecurity.

**Against the spiral of violence: dimensions of security networks in Nairobi**

Violence is a vicious spiral: it arises from the domestic implosion of traditional values and explodes in the public realm or in civil society to return and further damage the domestic dimension. Violence involves every dimension of society.

First, domestic violence has not specific abuse-targeted social groups. The violence victim can be the adult woman (35-45 years old) living with family in a brick and mortar house as well as the young man (17-25 years), self informal employed, living in a temporary shelter, but also the full-time formally employed with post-high school level education.

Secondly, violence enlarges to the community level because the most frequent abuse situations occur in the family as well as in the friendship environment and at the workplace in the conspiracy of the people assisting.

Thirdly, it involves institutions at each level. On one hand, the main perpetrators of violence and bribery to individuals are policemen, council askaris, city council in official as well as the private sector. On the other hand, Jeshi La Mzee is the private army utilized by the regime to established a social atmosphere of fear. Finally, violence comes back to the lowest and most excluded social groups again shattering their domestic dimension: prostitution, selling illicit brews, arms trafficking involve the most vulnerable groups such as migrants, women and street children while they create hidden international networks.

Aiming at urban visions that enable the collectivity to go beyond a local knowledge and understand the glocal linkages, namely the global/local linkages, behind urban change, Nairobi calls for multilevel and multidimensional policy networks to interrupt its spiral of violence. First, these are multilevel because they must contemporaneously consider space at the neighborhood and the urban level. Secondly, they are multidimensional because what needs to be faced is not which Strategy to choose, but strategies which are as different as the rationalities, urban images and social senses are. Thirdly, they are policy networks because they are incremental social learning processes based on the local dimensions of insecurity. As a result, Nairobi security networks are based on the following specific dimensions:

- **The two souls of Nairobi**

  Gender reaction to urban insecurity differs regardless of socio-economic distinctions.

  On one hand, men look at urban insecurity in terms of unemployment, environmental stress caused by hearing gunshots, illegal arms traffic, lack of institutional control. As a result, they consider gun possession as the way to identify a safer Nairobi: desire to own a gun is shared by 34.7% of men and 23.2% of women, 19.7% could have access to a gun against 7% of women, 4.6% carry a weapon (they are 40-59-year-old adults) against 1.5% of women.

  On the other hand, women look at insecurity in terms of poverty and street children issues. They defend themselves from crime by changing their daily behavior: avoid going out with money or valuables and using public transport are the most common habits to deal with the fear of crime. They look at the effectiveness of community policing as a good way to fight insecurity.

  The shared idea is that citizen actions to make Nairobi a safer places must involve the collectivity and not be left to individuals alone.
Social fear in the day: Nairobi Central Business District and the new borderlands

Nairobi Central Business District seems to externalize the clash between the global mode of living, the western one, and the plurality of local modes interacting daily in the surrounding areas. On one hand, NCBD performs its congested functional monodimensional role and turns into the most insecure place even in the day, although the highest incidence of violent and property crime occurs in residential areas. On the other hand, NCBD sees the sharp and growing contrast between the low-income or student street life in the night and the exclusive high-income services in protected tourist infrastructures. NCBD has anticipated a citywide change involving ever more different areas in Nairobi: it is the first urban borderland where a slow bottom-up process of taking possession goes hand in hand with the emigration of international and high-income class services. Security perception in informal settlements such as Korogocho similar to high income areas as Karen/Langata or to the industrial area Viwandani: these are “borderlands” where discontinuity is sometimes spatial or social as well as cultural but, above all, it turns from borderline into permanent and dynamic living space evidencing both its negative and positive feedback. On one hand, high crime rates, unemployment, informalization, migration flows lead to forms of individual adjustment and to community retreat; on the other hand, cultural diversity, self-organization, sharing of cultural norms or weak networks of solidarity create new spaces of community and new senses of citizenship: in any case, the borderlands express the change of urbanization patterns in Nairobi.

Security privatization versus urban disintegration

The emotional vulnerability of well-off social groups give a consistent input to real processes of security privatization and, as a result, of institution disintegration: there is a role conflict between police and private sector security organizations because the survival of the latter is highly linked to its efficiency and employers’ levels of satisfaction. Nairobi is witnessing the progressive growth of gated communities and protected private fortresses and the erosion of the social capital of the poor. On one hand, the manipulation of private space and the affordability of private police firms make security an exclusive socio-economic good, while protection measures such as protected windows, safety guards, special security door locks and high walls do not seem to prevent crime: 28% of households with a special window or door grill were burglarized while 26% without such security measures were also burglarized as well. On the other hand, temporary shelter, plastic bags and shacks are the highest victims of property-crime (62% within the category), indicating their severe vulnerability and further erosion of their social capital.

Informalization versus criminal economy

In Nairobi there is an intense symbiotic link between informal and formal sectors, with the vitality of the former depending upon the wages and demand generated by the latter. The commercial sector is strongly characterized by two distinct actors. On one hand, Asian formal traders have enterprises for more than 6 years, pay bribes to private sectors for some favor, know how to obtain justice by themselves and think that crime is decreasing because of the efficiency of the police, although 67% of the entire sample felt crime against the commercial sector had increased during the past year. On the other hand, African informal traders have young enterprises and barely survive because they cannot afford protection measures and suffer from threats and abuses perpetrated by known individuals. Furthermore, owing to the restructuring and privatization programs introduced in 1990, informal employment is still increasing. The current trend reflects structural changes in the labor market where the surplus labor force is shifting from formal to informal sector as opportunities for securing wage employment in the modern sector have become increasingly scarce. In 1992 formal wage employment in Nairobi was 376,200 persons (73% of those working) while 147,877 were engaged in the informal sector. In 1999, Nairobi city had 896,000 persons engaged in informal sector activities and took up the highest proportion of 24% among the eight provinces in Kenya. What must be pointed out is not only the quantitative incidence but also the changing
qualitative nature of the informal sector. It is possible to identify two different informal circuits: the internal aimed to the satisfaction of community members and the formal economy-related. From the Economic Survey 2000, Kenya sees within a year a consistent change in the nature of informal employment. Informal sector employment in the service sector (trades, hotel, restaurants, food kiosks, etc.) expanded by 11.6% to 2.4 million in 1999, thus accounting for 63.3% of the informal sector employment. The manufacturing sector (furniture making, metal fabrication, etc) took up the second largest share of 26.5% while community and personal services rose by 13.7% to account for 7%. The building and construction sector (artisans, stone quarries, etc) as well as transport had the smallest share of employed persons, with 1.6%. Consequently, the main categories of business carried out are service oriented, although there is a demand for manufactured products where activities are at the low value added end of business operations and incomes are generally low.

It should be noted that despite the reticence to speak out, service industry (32.5%) appears as more likely to pay bribe than production (29.2%) and retail (26.5) sectors.

To sum up, given that service industry has been spreading in urban areas and seems to be the most vulnerable to bribery and informalization, a new step should be undertaken, namely to explore networks between the informal, formal and also criminal economies. Selling illicit brews, smuggling from Somalia and engagement in commercial sex activities are prevalent in many of the informal settlements in Nairobi: they harbor and act as hideouts for hardcore criminals who are currently terrorizing the urban population in Nairobi and other centers in Kenya. What are the regional networks making it possible?

Relying on a policy network based upon the above dimensions, Nairobi loses its objective administrative boundaries, expands into the dynamic spaces defined by policy networks both at village and urban levels, enables the traditional city to open itself to the region and to create innovative relationships with it. To sum up, looking back at the whole process, the management of urban insecurity implies the detection, time by time, of the local contents of a security policy but in a structural perspective by opposing the image of a mobile and regionally connected city to the disconnected and primate one and, as a result, multilevel to mono-level urban space (Master Plan, Action Plan, etc...), multidimensional policy networks based upon urban identities to the one-dimensional policy based upon sectorial issues, the concept of public as plurality to that of the public as singular, the interactive knowledge to the professional/local knowledge distinction, creative communication to the top-down grid control.
A transnational perspective: community spaces into grids of violence

What are secure cities in globalization?
They are not cities closing themselves to change; they are not cities opening themselves to unknown change. Perhaps they are cities learning to know themselves, to be ahead of change, to collectively manage the perceived risks, to envision their own sense of glocalization and, as a result, to make urban space return from solely economic space to become community space again.

Conversely, globalization hinders this idea of endogenous and sustainable development. On one hand, top-down development policies have assisted or attempted to transform productively weak social contexts; on the other hand, violent cultures have evolved from the clan structures of the places of origin to form the gangster structures of the places of immigration.

Whether Africa, Europe, Asia or America – a shared identity emerges and is based upon extreme, apparently different, forms of ritualism and a common language, that of violence and conspiracy: globalization seems to go hand in hand with the silent institutionalization of violence. Primitive forms of Kenyan mafia, new mafias such as the Russian or the Albanian, rooted mafias like the Sicilian, Nigerian, Chinese: they go beyond territorial proximities; preserve links with their places of origin; create new criminal markets and unpredictable transnational networks made up of violence, social exclusion and economic power. To understand the local signs of such a global grid means adopting a glocal perspective and, as a result, paying attention to the spatial intersection between social, economic and criminal flows, and determine their linkages because these reflect the values from which societies arise and through which “community spaces” can be explored.

In the framework of the research “Time oriented policies and renewal of public spaces for urban security: the waterfront reclamation in Catania”, (Prof. Paolo La Greca - Architecture and Urban Planning Department of the Faculty of Engineering at the University of Catania), the renewal of the ancient and unsafe neighborhood San Cristoforo has to take these linkages into consideration. On one hand, local control is through large grids – when mature crime markets and petty crime are not integrated but shaped by forms of symbiosis, assimilation or violent clash between gangs- and self-regenerates through ever more “modern” criminal markets: from usury and bribery up to the new forms of zoomafia making these urban areas a “place of amusement” for every social class in Catania. On the other hand, the strength of such control turns into a local culture of conspiracy composed of institutional distrust, lack of collective action, domestic violence. The San Cristoforo case study makes it possible to explore the complexity of the intertwining between risk, insecurity and power that forces a place of traditional Sicilian culture to turn into a borderland marked by a rooted social stigma. Given that such structural uncertainty goes hand in hand with the sprawl of the services sector in Catania, the discontinuity of San Cristoforo emerges as both economic and socio-cultural.

First, commercial and craft activities are prevalent but there is an underground economy where informal services and craft activities mix with illegal ones and limit the opportunities for further development. The highest rates of youth unemployment and of school drop-outs facilitate the exploitation of juvenile employment and the recruiting of laborers by mafia clans, while the highest rates of dependent employment and self-employment constitute an economic environment vulnerable to the usury and bribery.

Secondly, although a tradition of high birth-rate persists, the number of single people living alone increases, domestic abuse to women and children is frequent and immigrants living in these areas are changing their social composition. Beside these local trends, there are linkages going beyond territorial proximity that need to be explored, such as the solidarity of family networks between San Cristoforo and other urban centers within the Catania metropolitan area, or the collusion between local and foreign mafias to gain control of criminal markets, as in the case of drug and prostitution.
Within such an urban context, the research program focuses on the external part of the neighborhood – which also represents the surroundings of the city port area – where discontinuity becomes strongly spatial and temporal. The local culture and the economy based upon the port and industrial activities have not succeeded in regenerating an urban identity while they have produced decay, abandoned industrial sites, multiplication of internal borders, contrasting urban times. Conversely, the urban system of empty plots which is emerging and its links with the architectural heritage offer the possibility to arrest the current process and initiate an urban regeneration passing through the compact and internal urban fabric. To sum up, the research program aims at detecting the contents and the modalities of social mobilization to encourage stakeholders to transform public spaces from competed and insecure land into the place where cultural diversity can be expressed and a glocal community can make its free choice of globalization.

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5 Smith, 2001
6 ibidem
7 Crosta, 1998
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9 civil society as the sphere of social interactions that make up the intimate sphere (family), associational life, social movements, and forms of public communication operating in the arena of the organized non-state, with origins in both modern and traditional bases of society (Rakodi, 1997)
10 through secondary data collection and qualified interviews
11 through multidimensional analysis (Factorial and Cluster Analysis)
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13 Stigliz, 2002
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26 Habitat, 2001 :2
27 ibidem
28 ibidem
29 Sassen, 2002
30 Current experiences in United States, Colombia and South Africa where the private police sector is predominant, report the increase both of criminal events and offenders in prison.
31 Friedman, 1997
32 Becchi, 2000
33 Body-Gendrot, 1993