

Integration and Disintegration: The View from the URBAN REGION

David C. Prosperi, Urban and Regional Planning, Florida Atlantic University, USA

Introduction

This is a reflective and theoretical paper. I begin by asking a pair of very simple questions: at what scale of resolution do I even start to think about the questions posed by the conference theme of **cities between integration and disintegration**; and second, what exactly is meant by the phrase **production** (emphasis in original) **of cities** in the call for papers? Clear responses turn out to be not so simple, but they eventually boil down to a focus on the notion and scale of the URBAN REGION, reliance on empirical verifiability, and a focus on spiritual, social, and economic well-being of regions' inhabitants as opposed to the creation of places. Throughout, I use several examples – the Turning Torso in Malmo, Sweden; the “Hanover Miracle”; the Daegu, South Korea ‘cultural industry core’ planning document, any “cultural quarter” as well as Istanbul – as evocative, iconic, or metaphorical images to focus arguments and positions.

URBAN REGIONS are, by nature, both integrated and disintegrated. Any specific URBAN REGION has *always been INTEGRATED*. Perhaps its most telling integrative attributes, however, is that is not something or somewhere else. Any specific URBAN REGION is integrated by its geography, place specific labor markets, local culture (monuments, buildings, customs, sports teams – although these may be weakening in the postmodern era), and most importantly by not being something or somewhere else. New York is integrated by its harbor, its economy, its culture, but equally by its' not being Miami. Istanbul is integrated by its placement on the Bosphorus, its role in important cultural debates over the centuries, but equally by its' not being Greek. Similarly London is integrated as a place because it is not Sheffield or Edinburgh or Paris! And, London is not Berlin: London is theater; Paris is Art, and Berlin is music. Integration by uniqueness and negation!

Similarly, any specific URBAN REGION has also *always been DISINTEGRATED*. Cities and their regions have always been characterized by segregated land use and social patterns (in fact, the planning profession is partially based on the ability to make these distinctions). Since the dawn of the modern industrial city – when Engels (1845) wrote about Manchester, England – there were always at least two “cities” – the modern downtown and shiny new economic clusters as well as working class housing and slums. Visitors saw the first (what the chamber of commerce wanted them to see), labor lived in the second. As cities grew and more labor was imported, spatial segregation along ethnic and racial lines occurred in empirically verifiable patterns, as matters of preference and/or exclusion. So, New York is not a single place, but many places. It is not only Wall Street, but also Harlem. The two places do not mix very well, and I suspect that the activity fields of the two are totally separate. The same is true of Istanbul. This conference is taking place in Taksim, and significantly not in Sultanahmet or across the Bosphorus in Asia.

The second phrase – **production of cities** – also evokes provocative questions and responses. The provocation rests on the current emphasis within the academic and professional planning literature on **process**. Cities and urban regions in this literature are not produced – they are the outcome, of supposedly or hopefully democratic, processes. For example, at a purely theoretical level, Harvey (1997) flatly states that cities are not products, but processes. In the postmodern era (read no universal principles, no Louis Napoleons', no Robert Moses'), planning becomes, in Harvey's words, militant particularism. One does not have to be a Marxist to get the point: planning is about (mostly) local (perhaps, spatially

insignificant) issues or projects. On the other hand, these processes sometimes are based on newer “moral” universals like sustainability or environmental justice. Think globally, act locally! as the saying goes. Furthermore, despite the increasing role of the private sector, planning remains mostly a public (or at least governmental) enterprise. However, there is wide variation across social and economic contexts about the expectations of government to provide both needed infrastructure (highways, sewers, etc.) improvements and conceptual spatial planning principles (e.g., the European Pentagon!) In the US, planning beyond the particular is mostly impotent. Europeans seem to demand more from their governments (and, in particular, inter-governmental arrangements). Planning is about the processes of allocating funds and/or diffusing spatial planning principles, rules, and regulations across multiple (lower level) jurisdictions. The degree to which the diffusion allows local control or is simply rules to be implemented also varies across countries and contexts (e.g., in Denmark and Holland spatial planning appears to be most powerful).

But, is that all there is? Cities and urban regions are centers of economic production, and perhaps more importantly, the locations where our spiritual, social, and economic well-being opportunities are presented and consumed. They are, in the words of Mumford (1938) stages for the urban drama – the playing out of peoples’ aspirations, motivations, and enhancement. They are products that citizens, hopefully, are proud of, collections of iconic monuments and culture. Chambers of commerce, at least, point to indicators such as gross product of places. But, what is the outcome of cities? At a minimum, there is a need for a notion of output!

Research Focus and Organization of Paper

The paper is organized in three sections. First, I argue that the only appropriate scale of analysis for questions of integration and disintegration is the URBAN REGION – the built up area and its fringes which are tied socially and economically to the center. Second, I reflect on six broad themes – which are sometimes policy directives, sometimes theoretical forces, sometimes empirical realities – that are played out in urban regions. They are: *centripetal and centrifugal forces; the new economy; polycentricity; the people versus place conundrum; immigration and social mixing; and the city management paradigm.* The final part speculates about the need for realistic visionaries, a return to region-wide comprehensive planning, and a plea to bring back the people into planning systems.

Establishing the URBAN REGION as the Unit of Analysis

There are three matters to be dealt with – language, a notion of output, and scale. First, what do we mean when we say “cities” or “city region”? And, for that matter, what exactly are those processes (like agglomeration) or attributes (like the creative class) that give shape and meaning to these places. Second, a significant part of the general “planning creates desirable outcomes assertion” (that is, with empirically verifiable improvements in the status of something) is also a language issue. It is conceptually impossible to demonstrate “improvement” if there are not objectives or criteria. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is a need for a unit of analysis. It is reasonably clear, particularly in the academic literature, that planners prefer – both conceptually and spiritually as well as pragmatically – small jurisdictions (e.g., arrondissements, districts, municipalities). These are places where democratic processes, or militant particularism, can and do occur (a good discussion of this is found in Friedmann (1987), but the original thought is Platonic). But, these types of places are for the most part not, and non-, economic entities. They are less likely to develop implementable meaningful economic development policies or to have planning departments. Moreover, individual planning projects might function as a single acupuncture needle -- useless unless accompanied by many other such treatments. IT is clear that system-wide effects are minimal at best. How many individual projects are needed to accomplish an

objective? Are small scale projects, with an emphasis on democracy and participation a force of disintegration?

URBAN REGIONS need diversity, icons, and size. Reproduced here are three images that capture the essential ingredients. The first is a view of Istanbul, obtained from Venere.com. It is interesting in that it shows that Istanbul, like all other large cities, is made up of distinct sub-areas (some not labeled). We came to Istanbul in search of exotic food, culture, and the bazaar. Who will cross the Bosphorus to Asia? Second, an image of Calatrava's marvelous state-of-the-art sustainable Turning Torso: 54 stories of residence and office in Malmö, Sweden. Not to be offensive, but Word did not recognize "Malmö." Is this an icon or part of an overall development (long range) plan? Finally, the RANDSTAD makes the Netherlands a competitive marketplace; canals in Amsterdam are cute, but the real money comes from the Schiphol, Zuidas, and market size of the entire region.



Research Problem and Methodology

The research problem is to explore, from a reflective theoretical position, those major types of behavioral or structural processes that give life and form to the URBAN REGION and to identify their role, if any, in either promoting or negating both integration and disintegration. While there are many such forces, here I have chosen to focus on six. They are: centripetal and centrifugal forces; the nature and spatial requirements of the new economy; the empirical and policy aspects of polycentric development patterns; the distinguishing principle of people v. place approaches; immigration and social mixing; and various iterations of the city management paradigm that places emphasis on process vice product.

For each theme, I adopt a three part structure: identification, use and evidence, and implications for integration and disintegration. The methodology is a mix of reflecting on theoretical literature, understanding of multiple disciplines (planning, architecture, economic development), and a planner's knowledge of what is happening in several urban regions. If there is a bias, it is towards the consideration of outcomes instead of processes and a consideration of what is empirically verifiable and on the ground.

Results

Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces

What is It? Colby (1933) recognized that "centrifugal forces ... impel functions to migrate from the central zone of a city towards, or actual to or beyond, its periphery, which the second includes powerful centripetal forces which hold certain functions in the central zone, and attract others to it." **Spatially-centripetal forces** are those behaviors or processes that strengthen the center of a place. **Spatially-centrifugal forces** are those that weaken the center and/or cause dispersion, and perhaps even disintegration.

In physics, these forces are opposite and equal. Centripetal forces are defined as,

$$F = M * V^2 / R$$

where M is the mass of the body, V is velocity, and R is the radius of its path. There is no equation for centrifugal forces other than the identity that it is equal.

Use and Evidence. Soja (1989) used this type of thinking to study the postmodern Los Angeles urban region. He argues, additionally, that traditional functions do not remain in same places within the region. For example, downtowns that were once the center of manufacturing and retailing are now centers of governments and associated functions. Increasingly, they are centers of tourism and/or localized targets of branding efforts.

Krugman (1998), an MIT economist, lists three broad centripetal and centrifugal forces, as follows: market-size effects (linkages), thick labor markets, and pure external economies; and, immobile factors, land rents, and pure external diseconomies. Krugman further argues that the traditional research designs often pit “pairs of forces” against each other to analyze possible implications and/or outcomes. He also notes that there is little empirical research.

Taken out of the realm of pure equilibrium economics, the main centripetal forces today seem to be city branding and marketing aimed at cultural tourism or the creation of economic development strategies for the central cities of urban regions.

The case of Daegu, South Korea is instructive, as much for its imprecision of language and for its representativeness of centripetal force making. The cultural industry core includes the following: (1) cultural content development (game design, animation, mobile phone contents, TV, films; (2) entertainment (festivals, performance, theme parks); (3) conventions; (4) logistics and distribution; and (5) sports and leisure.



As a policy strategy, it is a can't-miss success. But, does it make sense? And, how is it different from the strategy of Vienna, Istanbul, Berlin, Copenhagen or any number of cities?

Implications for Integration and/or Disintegration. The existence of theoretically **equal** center-seeking and periphery-expanding forces provides a powerful framework to allow analysis of how the interests of the center and those of the periphery are intimately integrated. It basically says that a strong region needs a strong center and vice versa, that activities devoted to strengthening the center will have benefits throughout the region, of equal magnitude. Furthermore, the perspectives make moot the question of choice of whether we want a stronger center or stronger suburbs. You get both, or neither. Perhaps more interesting could be cases of obvious disequilibrium: strong regions, weak centers or vice versa. In such situations, equilibrium is approached by corrective actions. Does this explain the re-centering of our major metropolitan areas over the past 15 years? If so, are centers growing faster than suburbs. But beware the equality provision in the longer term. Is the Turning Torso simply just a corrective action or will it also inspire regional growth?

The New Economy

What is It? The term “new economy” generally describes the knowledge economy and postmodern consumption. I would argue that this is only a stylistic change and that the traditional principles of spatial organization, agglomeration economies and accessibility, are still operative. The jingoistic terms – *economic clustering*, *the information technology revolution*, and *creative city/class/economy* – are stylistic difference: on the production side, we don’t manufacture things, we develop knowledge and experiences; as consumers, we buy highly commoditized things and experiences.

Use and Evidence. The geographic clustering of economic activities is still an important concept in the spatial economics of urban regions. Many authors (e.g., Porter, 2002, 2000; Van den Burg et al, 2001; Meijers and Romein, 2003) discuss the role of **economic clustering** theory and practice in the development of the new economy. Still with us are the standard principles of vertical and horizontal integration, but modern cluster theorists now include up to six or seven dimensions of clusters, including now the role of history, the impact of government policies, and cooperation or organizing ability (e.g., Maskell, 2001). Most of this economic cluster work stresses technology-dependent creative work and/or the bio-technology field. There is also a stream of work that focuses on recreation and some work on the role of cultural industries in creating place-based clusters (Mommaas, 2004).

The **information technology revolution** is passed; information technology as a factor of production has been with us for about a quarter of a century. Castells’ The Informational City (1989) is now standard wisdom, and both Castells (2001) and Friedman (2006) have demonstrated how “reductionism” in the production and consumption processes have made the world “flat.” Throughout the westernized world, at least, some places have taken advantage of this factor of production and some have not, creating a landscape of IT winners and losers. We have learned about Bangalore and South Bangalore, India; places that almost did not exist on the world stage; and we lament the ongoing digital divide and the continuing catching up needed in sub-Saharan Africa. However, Drennan (2002) has argued that not only have cities which have invested in IT been the winners in the post-industrial economy, but also that these benefits have indeed reached the urban working poor who toil in producer and advanced producer services industries, at least in American cities.

Finally, the new economy is about **knowledge** and **creativity**. While it is relatively clear that the proportion of the economic wealth created by the knowledge economy is increasing, the emphasis seems to be placed on the idea of creativity and cultural economies (Scott, 2000), which has spawned a cottage industry built around the creative signifier – the “creative city” (Landry, 2000), the “creative economy” (Howkins, 2001) and the “creative class” (Florida, 2002). Unfortunately, we tend to use these phrases interchangeably and without much thought, although it is clear that refer to different objects: political entities, economic cities, and occupational groupings. And, like many new concepts they beg definitional clarity (e.g., the creative class is probably not very creative in the artistic sense).

Aside from these “big three” descriptors of the new economy are a number of other considerations that, for the most part, are under-understood or down-played. Among these are (and the list is probably larger): the life-cycle of the worker (there is a big emphasis on the young; artsy types (Markusen, 2004), but not on the creative “suits”; there is a tendency to freeze residential choices at a point in time and not to understand changing residential preferences; there is a total ignoring of the remainder (the other 70% of the economy); etc.

Implications for Integration / Disintegration. Are these stylistically updated economic ideas forces of integration or disintegration any more than their previous versions? Spatial clustering of economic entities is clearly integrative at the point in space where they cluster, but disintegrative in terms of the URBAN REGION. Not every municipality or smaller place

can have a socially desirable (today: microbiology) significant cluster. Some might have to have the “tripe” cluster. But, what is clear is that URBAN REGIONS are made up of many clusters, some better developed than others, and that these are distributed spatially over the metropolitan area. Even within the same industrial sector, sub-clusters exist among the many activities within the cluster. For example, Gibson, Murphy and Freestone (2002) have showed that the consumption portion of the music industry is population-dependent and tends to be located where there are consumers, while the location of production of those consumable products is suburban.

At the scale of the URBAN REGION, it is very clear that production of goods, and even producer services, is decentralizing. The importance of accessibility to workplace continues to be paramount. But, as workers in westernizing economies continue to adopt western forms of transportation (the car!), accessible locations are often on the periphery of the region. Too numerous to list here are study after study that show the economic concentration of economic activity (e.g., auto manufacture in Brussels, telecommunications in Madrid, etc) in suburban locations.

Of particular interest are those clusters that still rely on movement of goods, parts, ideas in the production-chain. Airports and the land around them are “high accessibility” places. Places that have “ports” including air freight are becoming more and more significant as the demand for product variation (e.g., Richard Florida’s “blue” eye glass frames) increases. We need to more about supply chains and the land devoted to “freight.”

If productive economic activities are dispersing, downtowns are becoming integrated as “theme parks” and “government centers.” While not the intended use of Sorkin’s “variation on a theme park,” downtowns are indeed becoming themed, as illustrated by the Daegu example above. Downtowns are becoming places of entertainment, with a significant portion of dollars spent by visitors, and places for conferences. While this phenomena may be Integrating within a global knowledge network, it is perhaps disintegrating at the scale of the individual URBAN REGION.

The IT revolution is probably the most cited reason for spatial dispersion or the disintegration of the built environment. If we can work at home (or in India) then the city or urban region does not have to be compact. Travel times become shorter; downtowns are made irrelevant as places of productive enterprises, etc. But, interestingly, as Niles and Hanson (2003) have pointed out that the exact opposite has happened. Downtowns have intensified over the same time period encapsulated the revolution, perhaps reflectively of the principle that we still need face to face contact.

The creative signifier is associated with both integration and disintegration. Clearly, the creative economy is responsible for enabling productive and competitive economic spaces to be made, but often in non-traditional locations. But, traditional spaces for artists (fringes of economically competitive spaces – downtown or elsewhere) continue to flourish or exist, like the 7th and 2nd districts in Vienna.

Perhaps the creative class notion will focus attention on the life-cycle of workers in addition to their occupations. I see a strong association with this creative class concept and youth, and almost youth alone. The association with bars and entertainment is an urban chic thing, only a part of the spatial economy. The real creative class – the financiers, the engineers, and the bio-scientists – are older, have children, and live in the suburbs.

Finally, the new economy is about consumption, and more than that, idiosyncratic consumption. If we are all postmodern individuals with little loyalty and a preference for experience over product, we go where that is. We will tire of Paris and canned experiences; we will seek the “other side of the Bosphorus.”

Polycentricity: Policy or a Product?

What is it? Polycentricity, at its most fundamental definitional level, means that there is (or should be) more than one center in a system (urban region). As a lark, I did a GOOGLE image search on the term, which yielded several (not as many as I had anticipated) images. There were the traditional BANANA type images of Europe and various architectural manifestation of new city center. But the most interesting is the Matisse painting,



which a blogger (The Filter, Oct 2005) calls a near perfect representation of **analytical egalitarianism**. Analytical egalitarianism, according to the blogger, "helps us vanquish the Socratic claim to find impartial or trustworthy planners ... There's an irrefutable hypocrisy (sic) underlying modern egalitarians, since their analytics assume pluralism. Political systems are hopelessly bound by elitism." All of which brings me to the central question: is Polycentricity a policy or a product?

Use and Evidence. There are two uses for the term Polycentricity, both of which are scale dependent. I would argue that the original meaning of the word is analytical or empirical, rooted in regional science models of urban land use. Formulated in the mid 20th century, they basically assumed a single downtown that contained all jobs. Throughout the late 20th century, various researchers tried to reformulate the model to include multiple centers. Graphics appeared that showed these multiple centers; the fundamental locational criteria appeared to have been the intersection of two major highways, one of which is a "ring road" around the old central city. For example, Prosperi (1990) showed that land values in Orlando, Florida are neatly predicted by both time and location of these "suburban centers."

The second use of the term is normative. At the scale of the European Union, Polycentricity appears to be a desired end state. There are groups, such as the European Spatial Planning Observation Network (ESPON, www.espon.eu), that monitor such development. Davoudi (2003, 2002) has traced this debate and shows how the word, derived from the previously discussed research on spatial equilibrium models, is now the discussion of policy. Accordingly, studies are now conducted that compare top-down with bottoms-up polycentric development schemes (e.g., Rossignolo and Toldo, 2006).

Implications for Integration / Disintegration. Polycentricity within urban regions is an empirical reality and here to stay (as long as the oil to run cars is available). They have been formed and are nurtured by private sector market decisions. Polycentric mega-regions are also here to stay. What is unclear is that all of these centers – at either the scale of the individual urban region or at the scale of the mega-region (e.g., the RANDSTAD, or even the larger EU) should be the same, either in terms of economic makeup or political power.

Polycentricity is indeed an integrating phenomenon, both at the scale of the individual centers and also at the scale of providing a comprehensible mental image of the urban region. Simultaneously, it serves to disintegrate former monopoly centers or other monopoly type functions. Clearly, we need to know more about the individual makeup of these centers – which functions are repeated, which are unique (e.g., Kloosterman and Musterd, 2001).

Can a government or transnational agency promulgate polycentricity as a form of social equity? Should it?

The People v. Place Conundrum

What Is It? For better or worse, most of the activity called planning is about place. Planners create **places**, evaluators take measurements of **places**, and policy makers allocate resource to and by **place**. The underlying assumption, of course, is that planning matters, in the traditional Platonic or Athenian sense, for the true improvement of the spiritual, social and economic well being of the people living in those places. Is this a heroic assumption? But, in other than participatory or collaborate planning processes at the local scale, planning at best ignores and at worst disrespects the “people.” Are planning projects or outcomes related to people’s well being?

The conundrum between “place prosperity” and “people prosperity” is due to Winnick (1966). The core issues are twofold: peoples’ lifetime trajectories diverge from place, and a place’s residents do remain constant over time.

Use and Evidence. Both the planner Myers (1999) and the political scientist Dahl (1994) have argued this dilemma at both the intra-regional and inter-regional scales. Myers argues that **demographic dynamism** should be the basis for urban theory and policy initiatives. Dahl discusses the dilemma between [supposed] **system effectiveness** and citizen participation. At a more theoretical level, Bolton (1982) argues that place factors are consistent with certain theories of household production, fairness and community values. And, at a more pragmatic level, Sawicki and Flynn (1996) discuss the conceptual and measurement issues associated with “neighborhood indicators.”

The “people versus place” debate is rarely distinguished in planning discussions. This occurs for two reasons, both scale-dependent. First, militant particularism – the dominant mode of planning at the local level does include people in the discussion, but it is mostly about spatially-limited actions; nevertheless, there is some sense of community in the discussion, so what is the fuss? Second, planning appears to be becoming more of a set of institutional arrangements and institutional processes than about built environments or people’s well being. Institutional actors tend to deal with other institutional actors; who cares about the people; it is easier to send money or devise programs. Why would a planner worry about Joe when the EU has program X?

For both serendipitous (author’s name) and symbolic (this discussion) reasons, I became aware of and interested in the “Prosperidad” transit stop in Madrid. Upon alighting, one arrives at a place called “prosperity!” I spent a few hours there -- Prosperidad is a commune within the Madrid urban region – at one time separated by distance and temperament. Today, it is an inner ring suburb, a working class community.

Place-based strategies lead to place-based solutions, and probably not-coincidentally, to the 21st century pre-occupation with branding. Evidence of such thinking is pervasive – the need to cultural quarters (everywhere in Britain that is not already a major place) to the need for iconic buildings (Turning Torso in Malmo). Does either improve the spiritual, social and/or economic well-being of citizens in any of those places?

Implications for Integration / Disintegration. The fundamental issue is whether these “place-based” strategies – including branding – serve to integrate the URBAN REGION or propel its’ disintegration. The answer if often both: Prosperidad is both integrated and separated.

Continuation of place-based strategies emphasizes spatial “winners” and spatial “losers.” It leads to glorification (supposed) of iconic buildings, invented clusters, and places. They may serve to integrate the region at a global scale, but they tend to disintegrate the region at the scale of the individual region. But, it also serves to segregate various lifestyles and action fields. What about the other 99.9% of the landscape?

(Im)migration and Social Mixing

What is it? European civil unrest in 2005 and perhaps visions of poverty in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina has propelled income and class disparities into the news in a manner unprecedented since the 1960s. Reconsideration within a planning framework is needed to examine two major questions: the movement of people from one place to another; and, where immigrants live once they arrive in their new destinations.

Use and Evidence. Throughout history, there has always been a flow of workers from job-poor regions to job-rich regions. Within the last half century, the post-colonial era witnessed large migrations from former colonies to mother countries and their prime cities – Algerians to France, Indians to Britain, etc. In the 1990s, large immigration flows have been occurring from Eastern Europe towards more industrialized places – Poles to Germany, etc. And, even more recently, large movements from the Middle East to the west – Turkey appears to be a major exporter of talent – particularly the young to educational magnet centers.

Many of these movements are inspired by the potential for economic gain. This flow can be explained by both push and pull factors: push factors because there are simply few jobs in the home land; and pull factors, because the populations of westernized places do not want to or have escaped performing “unwanted jobs:” those at the lower end of the prestige scale. This is “labor” in its original meaning. However, immigrants are not distributed evenly over the national landscape. There is a marked preference for what Frey (2006) calls immigration magnets. In France, where the Muslim population is approaching 9% of the total population, large concentrations are found in a limited number of metropolitan areas.

But, the second issue is perhaps more vexing from the purpose of examining integration and disintegration. Where they live within the spatial context of the URBAN REGION, how are they treated, and how are they absorbed is constant fodder for research and policy. Almost since the dawn of the modern industrial city, social separation has been the empirical reality. This pattern was clearly identified by Engels (1845), described most cogently by the Chicago school scholars such as Burgess (1927), examined constantly through the 20th century, and updated more systematically by Madanipour (1998). For the most part, processes remain unchanged; the human race seeks closeness of likeness and separation from the “other.”

A number of related points can be made: (1) behaviors and residential patterns of first-generation immigrants are well known; (2) assimilation results in the decline of first generation ghettos while newer ones appear in suburbs; (3) residential segregation at the scale of the urban region persists, even though we don't like to talk about it; and (4) ‘safe’ ethnic neighborhoods are celebrated by non-locals and tourists, although their functionality as neighborhoods continues to decline and be weakened by external sources.

Implications for Integration / Disintegration. If human beings tend to cluster and segregate along similar demographic lines, then continued immigration will continue the disintegration of the urban fabric. It is significant that note that the French unrest was localized in Clichy-sous-Bous, not the part of Paris where tourists go. On the other hand, immigration also tends to increase urban diversity, provides labor for the service economy, and fosters creativity, all integrating forces within the urban region.

There is a need to better understand demographics. We need to know and acknowledge that differences due to such “independent” variables as age, (life cycle), gender, race, and religion matter. Age and life-cycle appear particularly fruitful areas for more analysis.

Immigration and social mixing is related to two others issues: the creation of elite spaces for the wealthy; and those studies that focus on conditions in the barrio and on the use of technologically-driven participatory planning systems to do something (of use? For them?).

The City Management Paradigm

What is It? Basically, this is planning with an institutional fingerprint. It is about rules, and the allocation of resources from larger units of government to smaller units of government. It has a distinct “public policy” flavor. It is about urban, regional, and transnational institutions and the “arrangements” they make among themselves. It favors regionalism, regional cooperation and even transnational planning and cooperation. It focuses on decision makers. But, It is also heavily rhetorical; and, for the most part out of the sphere of influence of normal citizenry.

Use and Evidence. There are two issues of political economy to be considered when dealing with public policy (and perhaps planning). The first is ideology. There seems to be a correlation between political ideology and ‘starting points’ for discussion or debate. Generally, conservatives are more likely to start with individuals (firms, people) while liberals are more likely to talk in terms of aggregates (macroeconomic indicators such as the regions GDP). Politicians of either persuasion tend to adopt the liberal stance, often framing issues in terms of generalities or single, non-benchmarked, numbers (e.g., the increase in ...). Second, public policy research, of the highest standard, follows a fairly predictable and rigorous methodology based in microeconomics. The standard approach is to assess the efficiency, effectiveness, and equity of policies. References to the mathematically intractable statements such as “getting the most for the least” are rare in the scholarly literature.

The city management paradigm is heavily influenced by principles associated with **resource dependence and dependency** (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The simple argument here is that those who control the money also control the mission and the implementation. When expectations of government are high (like in the EU), it is virtually impossible to discuss an urban issue without reference to what EU program will cover the expenses, and what regulations will provide guidance or constraint.

Related to the dependency issue are questions of governments’ effectiveness at various levels of ‘removal’ from constituents. Are regional governments more or less equally responsive than other levels of governments across the sets of services provided?

Metropolitan governance is a much preferred form of institutional arrangements within the city management paradigm. Heinelt’s (2006) concluding plenary at the 2006 EURA conference discussed the “Hanover Miracle” -- a joint city-regional political arrangement that altered the financing and integrating of some public services. While clearly a model of institutional cooperation, no evidence was provided about actual changes in service delivery. Was it better? Worse?

Perhaps we will never know. Putnam’s (2000) lamentation of the decline of **social capital** or civic engagement is also in play within this paradigm. Lest we forget, the “client” of public planning is the public – increasingly one that has become, in certain contexts, less interested in public life. Professional social capital -- in the form of being the grease of knowledge networks, economic clusters, and (organizing capacity) as well as the social networks within the formal planning institutions themselves, however, seems on the rise.

Implications for Integration / Disintegration. The issue should be outcomes or products, not institutional arrangements. The connection needs to be transparent. Without such transparency, it is difficult to determine whether they are pro-integration or pro-disintegration.

At times, the city management paradigm appears at times narcissistic. Analysis of a set of institutional arrangements is undertaken, unevenness of something is detected, and a change is made. It is hoped that unevenness evens out (analytical egalitarianism) or is at least ameliorated. End game. But, is evenness a condition for integration?

Conclusions and Extensions

From the UN inspired “think globally, act locally” to Harvey’s “militant particularism” planners have capitalized on their “resource dependency” in pursuit of “analytically egalitarian” solutions for sets of places. Modern society seems to have a command and control process capability of managing the process. And, we have URBAN REGIONS that are still socially segregated and perhaps isolated, foster disintegration among and people, and continue to exhibit distinct functional sectors and areas. The paradox, of course, is that these same URBAN REGIONS have glitzy, if shallow, downtowns and websites which seem to indicate that “all is well” [in Neverland?].

Well, all is not well. And no “Hanover miracle,” “Turning Torso,” or “Polycentric” scheme will necessarily improve the spiritual, social, and economic well-being of a regions’ citizens. It is not my intention to lay the blame on planners, but, having reviewed some of the forces that are at work in our URBAN REGIONS, three things seem to be needed: realistic visionaries, a return to region-wide comprehensive thinking, and real inclusion of citizens.

The Need for Realistic Visionaries

Planning should not be about rules and regulations; it should be about doing better. Don’t we have a bit of utopian gene matter deep inside of us?

Unlike former utopians who started with blank slates (or cleared land) and complete control, contemporary planners deal with URBAN REGIONS that are a constellation of contexts and results from the past. For the lack of a better term, we need realistic visionaries. Realistic visionaries understand that outcomes and product are more important than process. Realistic visionaries understand the scale and significance of local projects. Realistic visionaries understand that Polycentricity is an empirical reality, built in large part by the private sector in its own internal quest for efficiency. Realistic visionaries would ask “how many ‘cultural cores’ are needed to make the URBAN REGION a competitive entry into the cultural economy?” Above all, they would not make empty statements.

The Need to Return to Region-wide Comprehensive Thinking

The piecemeal approach to planning – stressing various rules and regulations and/or the supposed value of iconic architectural projects – results in uneven development, even at the site of improvement. Uncoordinated projects, implemented because money was available, create, often, redundant or unnecessary services. Similarly, small scale projects are like single-needle “urban acupuncture” – simply, not enough without the rest of the treatment.

Scale is important. Perhaps a new focus on transportation is the essential ingredient to foster potential integration. Transportation involves the links between all the multi-modes. As airports become the new railroads in a global society, airports and the land around them become the new highest points of accessibility.

Bring Back the People, Really

Modern planning ignores or disrespects the people.

Perhaps it is time to spend more energy on issues that go beyond the top 2% of the population (modern downtowns, convention centers, etc.). Perhaps it is time to build collaborative planning (the systems that focuses on small scale projects) processes that are not based or designed on Lacanian principles (e.g., Hillier and Gundel, 2005) which assume that the citizen is sick and needs professional services. What? This offends me. Bring back the people!

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