The Separation Wall around Jerusalem/al-Quds: Truncating the Right to the City of the Palestinians *

Introduction

The urban fabric of Jerusalem/ al-Quds originally developed within the Old City, which was surrounded by a wall until the mid of the nineteenth century. It later began to develop organically, until an ethno-national conflict emerged in the 1920th. This conflict led to the division of the city after the War of 1948 between the Arabs and Israelis. In 1967, Israel occupied East Jerusalem, which had been under Jordanian rule, and annexed it to West Jerusalem, under Israeli rule. Israel further demarcated a new municipal boundary. The boundaries between Jerusalem and the West Bank were open until 2002, when Israel began to build a new wall.

The process of building the separation wall continues around Jerusalem/al-Quds, as decided by the government of the State of Israel. The route of the wall, in face, has been unilaterally determined by Israel despite Palestinian and international opposition. For the most part it does not separate Palestinians from Israelis, but instead crosses through inhabited areas of Palestinian neighborhoods and separates Palestinians from Palestinians more than it separates Palestinians from Israelis.

The construction of the wall in the Jerusalem area has given rise to controversy, revolving not only around the motivations behind it and the need to erect it, but also concerning its route, the efficacy of its security role, and its implications upon the city and its spatial development. The dispute is also conceptual, focusing on the question of what the wall is to be called and its future rule. There are various terms for the wall, used by various observers, such as "security fence", "wall", "obstacle", and "separation wall". The differences between the names reflect the dispute regarding the essence of the wall, and express differences in views regarding its rationale, objectives, and goals, and its performance and geopolitical status, as well as the narratives of the sides involved and affected by it: Palestinians, Israelis, and the international community. Some argue that the motivations behind the erection of the wall are both security-based and demographic, both to prohibit suicide bombers and Palestinians from entering Jerusalem without an Israeli permit, and that it will ultimately be used as a geopolitical border both of the Municipality of Jerusalem and of the State of Israel; in other words, that the wall will serve as a national border, a municipal border, and an ethno-national border as well.

To date quite a lot has been written on the implications of the separation wall erected along the entire length of the West Bank (Khamaisi, 2006), and in the Jerusalem area (Michael & Ramon, 2004; Garb, 2004; Kimchi, 2006; Bark, 2004; Brooks et al., 2005), on the fabric of life of the Palestinian population. However, many aspects have not yet been examined, specifically those regarding its effect on the fabric of life in the city of Jerusalem and its space, as well as on the relations between Palestinians and Israelis generally. The separation wall is not a routine physical component in the area. It is a component which creates a new geographic space, and affects the configuration of the landscape and sociopolitical and socioeconomic links, while at the same time creating the geopolitical space and consciousness of both of the populations – Palestinian and Israeli.

The erection of the separation wall cannot be construed as fulfillment of a ‘separation’ demand along the lines of ‘we be here, and they be there’, because the wall does not

separate between populations. It is possible that in the short term, with the present distribution of power and control, the fence will provide a partial security solution, but it cannot ensure geopolitical and security stability inside of the city of Jerusalem, or between it and its natural urban environs. This article contends that as long as the national and civil rights of the Palestinians in the city of Jerusalem are not honored and safeguarded, and geopolitical arrangements are not established to make possible the development of the city for the welfare of its residents and the entire area, the security situation will remain as dangerous and unstable as it is now. All this, in addition to the fact that the wall causes the city to suffer from less development and to be cut off from its hinterland.

This article examines the denial of the Palestinians’ right to the city as a result of the erection of the separation wall, and attempts to draw a general outline of the implications of that denial. First, the principles of ‘the right to the city’, as developed and established in the published literature by the French philosopher Lefebvre (Lefebvre, 1996; Salmon 2001; Purcell 2002), will be presented. I state at the outset that I am aware of the fact that the point of departure of “the right to the city” is based upon municipal "citizenship", whereas the situation in Jerusalem is linked to a political national struggle. It is to be expected that after the construction of the separation wall and the shaping of the geopolitical border, a large number of Palestinians will be left inside Jerusalem who will be completely denied their right to the city. The right to the city is currently unexercised, as neither side, Israeli or Palestinian, wants to "tie the knot" in the shadow of the security wall; that is a tested recipe for damaging the city and the fabric of life within it. The centralism of the Israeli nation-state, and that of the evolving Palestinian one, will continue to determine the character of the urban space of Jerusalem, and will prevent local residents from shaping the space and their lives independent of central government intervention. Furthermore, both nation-states can be expected to reject summarily the idea of granting special status to Jerusalem as proposed in the partition plan for Palestine in 1947 (UN resolution No. 181), or an arrangement similar to "Jerusalem DC", which would grant the right and power to shape the urban space to the citizens and residents of Jerusalem/al-Quds, even within the boundaries of the wall.

The second part of the article is devoted to examining the principles of the current policy forced on the city by the central government. That policy is intended to ensure Israeli control and hegemony over Jerusalem, and shapes the urban fabric and the relations within the city. The wall's implications on the disparities between Palestinians and Israelis will be described below. This article concludes with a discussion intended to establish the arguments raised throughout, by presenting scenarios regarding the types of relations between Palestinians and Israelis in the era of the wall. The article offers a different approach for dealing with the challenge of honoring the national and civic Palestinians’ right to the city. Honoring that right is likely to secure stability, contribute to the development of the city and its fabric of life, and liberate the city from the siege conditions created by the separation wall.

The Right to a City: Between Nationality and Citizenship

The point of departure of Lefebvre's conceptions (Lefebvre, 1991; 1996) is the right of citizens and inhabitants to active and effective realization of their urban citizenship. Ensuring and safeguarding a sustainable right to the city is, in this theory, made possible by transferring power and control from the nation-state and large financial interests to the urban inhabitants. The idea of "the right to the city" expresses a new political point-of-view regarding citizenship and residence.

Lefebvre does not define political identity in terms and concepts such as civil status anchored in a national constitution; he instead bases it on a natural definition of 'inhabitant status'. The idea is that all who live in the city are granted legitimate rights to the city. According to this definition, Lefebvre determines two basic principles underlying the ‘right to a city’: the first principle is the right to participation, and the second is the right to appropriation (Purcell,
2003). The right to participation means that the inhabitants of the city fulfill a central and decisive role in every decision contributing to the creation and shaping of the urban space, including decisions made under the auspices of the state or large financial interests, at all levels. The right to appropriation includes the inhabitants’ full and absolute right to free physical access to the urban space and to movement within it, as well as the right to possess and occupy the urban space and to use it in an unlimited fashion. Harvey (2003) further expanded the definition of those entitled to the right to the city, including all inhabitants – children, immigrants, women, and various socio-cultural and socio-economic groups. Ya'akobi (2006) defines the right to the city as freedom, realization of the right to identity and to an individual and collective way of life, and the right to participation in decision-making and in creating the urban space. Thus, the right to the city exists not only due to national, ethnic, or native identity, but rather as a result of day-to-day life de facto in the urban space and among its consumers. The idea of the right to the city thus presents a challenge to definitions of citizenship according to the liberal democratic or ethnic democratic systems of government (Smooha, 1998), and contradicts the Westphalian idea by which political allegiance is determined hierarchically, through the individual's joining the nation-state (Hettne, 2000).

The idea of 'the right to the city' can be included in the framework of the radical approach of reconstructing formal citizenship, manifest in three changes as defined by Purcell (2003): first, redefinition of citizenship by weakening the national dimension and reinforcing the urban-local, or global-cosmopolitan dimension. The second change is geographical redistribution of citizenship. This change raises doubts regarding the strong link between the geographical sovereignty of the nation-state and the political loyalty to the nation-state, and leads to a redistribution of the powers and authority with the local-urban government. The third change is the redirection of citizenship, far from the national group, considered to be the hegemonic political society, and from 'the citizens', who are considered to be a homogenous entity. Thus redirection of citizenship creates an identification with and loyalty to multicultural political societies. In an age of globalization, processes are taking place which change the traditional relationship between the nation-state and citizenship, and a new agenda is raising the importance of locality/municipality, including the 'right to the city' as a space generating a sense of belonging and civil loyalty.

Are such processes possible in Jerusalem, through development of a "Jerusalemite" identity and a "Jerusalemite" right? The claim is that against the reality of the separation wall, the character of the political regime and the Jewish nation-state which guide urban policy and shape the space in Jerusalem, and, on the other side, the Palestinian aspirations to establish their nation-state with al-Quds as its capital – are two processes which generate a national political consciousness that does not allow the development of the right to the city in Jerusalem. This is the claim that will be examined in this article.

Despite a policy of delegation of powers and the promotion of privatization in the State of Israel, the idea of a ‘right to a city’ has not taken root in Israel, primarily in Jerusalem. Jabarin (2006) noted that the right to the city in the State of Israel is, for the most part, denied to urban inhabitants, both Jews and Arab, albeit not equally (ibid: 10). The absence of the right to the city stems from the centralized nature of the political regime in Israel and its control and distribution of power resources (Nachmias, 2005). That centralism is palpably manifest in land management, ownership, and planning (Khamaisi, 2003). The planning system is hierarchical, concentrated, and obligatory. It controls 93 percent of the state's lands via the Israel Lands Authority. All decisions and municipal by-laws are subject to statutes and to the approval of the Interior Ministry, which is responsible for local government. -The Interior Minister is authorized to remove mayors, determine the areas of municipal jurisdiction, and to approve their plans, including determination of the scope of their income and the distribution of land resources in them on a centralized statutory planning basis. All these are indicators of a deficit in the right to the city in Israel. In the case of Jerusalem, the situation is even worse. There are governmental committees, e.g. "The Ministerial Committee on Jerusalem"
(Merchav & Giladi, 2003: 269-272), and even a Minister for Jerusalem Affairs, contradicting the municipality's attempt to establish agencies and neighborhood committees that could intensify the inhabitants' partnership and involvement in the management of the city.

There is the further question of whether the erection of the separation wall will aggravate the denial of the right to the city in Jerusalem, especially with regards to the Palestinian population. Might coalitions of city inhabitants, Israelis and Palestinians, arise as a result of the erection of the wall? Will they lead a civil struggle for their right to the city, led by civil society, as a part of the vicissitudes of the conflict, turning a national struggle over Jerusalem into a civil struggle for the right to the city?

**Existing Policy Denies Palestinians the Right to the City**

Underlining the idea of the right to the city are the shrinking role of government, the sense of identification with it, and the intensification and reinforcement of the local-urban role. Such a process might develop in cities with political stability and economic prosperity. In cities experiencing political struggle, ethno-political segregation, and socioeconomic gaps, the right to the city can be expected to decrease. The governmental policy in Israel, characterized by direct and active intervention in shaping the urban space and in creating the urban fabric of life — intervention which directly limits the right to the city — will be briefly surveyed below.

**The Determination of the City Limits by the Government of Israel**

The national struggle for control in Jerusalem began in the 1930's. That struggle reached its peak with the partition of the city in 1948 between West Jerusalem, under Israeli control, and East Jerusalem, under Jordanian control. The partition was not in line with the plan for partitioning Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one Arab, with the special status of corpus separatum reserved for Jerusalem. In 1949, the border between East and West Jerusalem was determined as the armistice line, also known as the Green Line. In 1967 Israel conquered East Jerusalem and all the territory of the West Bank from the Jordanians. Israel decided to annex and apply Israeli law to East Jerusalem and the villages adjacent to Jerusalem, such as Shuafat, Isawiyeh, Jabel Mukaber, and Tsur Baher, and unilaterally decided upon the borders of those parts of the West Bank to be annexed, including Jerusalem. In 1980 Israeli Parliament (Knesset) enacted its Basic Law: Jerusalem the Capital of Israel, which determines that "Unified Jerusalem in its entirety is the capital of Israel." The UN passed a series of resolutions opposing the annexation of the territories of East Jerusalem and of the Palestinian villages included in the annexed border, comprising approximately 70,000 dunams, whereas the area of jurisdiction of Eastern/Jordanian Jerusalem was comprised of only 6,000 dunams. According to the basic law, the municipal border of the "Unified Jerusalem" municipality is also the border of Israeli sovereignty. In 2000 the Knesset amended the basic law, determining that "no authority, regarding areas within the limits of Jerusalem, which is granted to the State of Israel or to the Municipality of Jerusalem, shall be transferred to a foreign political or governing body, or to any other similar foreign body, whether permanently or for a determined period" (Lapidot, 2003: 220). Thus the Jerusalem city limits were determined by a national government decision, and the municipality and its inhabitants had no effect on or involvement in determining them.

Similarly, part of the route of the separation wall, determined by the government, mostly lies along the border of the city as approved by Basic Law: Jerusalem the Capital of Israel. In some places, territory within the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem was left beyond the wall, and in yet other places the wall contains within it additional territories which were not previously within the Jerusalem city limits or under the sovereignty of the State of Israel. The policy of determining the borders of the city of Jerusalem, which overlap the Palestinian
territories, as the borders of Israeli sovereignty, was based on ethno-demographic and geopolitical territorial considerations.

Although the State of Israel annexed Palestinian territory conquered in 1967, determined the eastern border of Jerusalem and applied Israeli sovereignty and law to it, it employed a quite different policy toward the status of the Palestinian population in the city. Since 1967, the State of Israel has granted members of the Palestinian population in East Jerusalem the default status of "permanent residents in Israel". In practice, this means that Israel annexed the land without annexing the people. As permanent residents, the Palestinian Jerusalemites carry Israeli identity cards, but do not have Israeli citizenship, instead continuing to hold Jordanian citizenship alongside Israeli residency. Being "permanent residents", the Palestinians in East Jerusalem are entitled to choose their representatives in the municipality, but being devoid of Israeli citizenship they do not carry an Israeli passport, and are not permitted to participate in Knesset elections.

It should be noted that East Jerusalem's Palestinian inhabitants have been granted the right to adopt Israeli citizenship, but only a small minority has done so, the overwhelming majority preferring to continue to hold Jordanian citizenship. With the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem also attained the option of participating in Palestinian presidential and legislator elections. As a result of this situation, the Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem are today torn between three identities; Israeli residency, Jordanian citizenship, and Palestinian political consciousness and participation.

Despite the fact that the right to participate in Jerusalem's municipal elections was granted to the Palestinians in Jerusalem, most have to date refrained from participating in these elections. This is a result of the fact that the Palestinians in Jerusalem do not recognize the occupation or forced annexation, and wish to avoid granting legitimacy to the Israeli occupation by way of participation in the municipal elections. They have thus waived this right, and waived a claim for civil equality in the city, as part of demanding an end to the Israeli occupation. De facto, this complex status, and its ensuing political conduct, denies the Palestinians the right to urban participation, and to appropriation, creation and shaping of the urban space.

The Municipality of Jerusalem initiated a policy of establishing neighborhood agencies in the city in order to intensify the participation of the inhabitants in the management of their neighborhoods. In realizing that policy, three agencies were established in the Palestinian neighborhoods in the city: A-Tur, Beit Hanina and Beit Tsafafa (Ramon, 2003: 262-267). Because these agencies failed to receive recognition from the Palestinian population, their ability to represent it and to participate in decision making and in shaping the municipal landscape is limited. The erection of the wall did not effect any change in the permanent resident status of the native Palestinian population, which further limits these agencies' ability to lead to its participation in creating and shaping the urban space.

The Separation Wall and the Demographic Motivation

One of the terms that has been used for describing the separation wall is "the demographic wall", which expresses the view that the wall is intended to reduce the number of Palestinian residents in the city of Jerusalem by removing neighborhoods, inhabited by approximately 55,000 Palestinians, from the city, and separating Palestinians from Palestinians, such as in the area of al Ram, Dahiat al Brid, and Abu Dis (Khamaisi & Nasrallah, 2005). An ethno-demographic policy and majority-minority relations constitute central components in determining the spatial and functional policies of the government of Israel and the Municipality of Jerusalem, and serve as the motivation for the process of erecting the separation wall between Palestinians and Israelis, particularly in Jerusalem (Sopher &
Pollack, 2003; Kimchi, 2006). Since 1967, the Governments of Israel have adopted a policy of ensuring a "demographic balance", whose purpose is ensuring a Palestinian minority in Jerusalem that is no larger than one-third of the city's inhabitants. The formula of 30% Palestinians versus 70% Israelis has guided the spatial planning policy, the housing policy, the political arrangements and the outlining of the city limits (Khamaisi, 2006; Khamaisi & Nasrallah, 2006; Margalit, 2006). The very concept "demographic balance" is misleading, as it implies a neutral policy intended to preserve the balance between the two populations in the city. In fact, as mentioned, it is intended to preserve the demographic supremacy of the Jewish population of the city (B'tselem, 1995), and thus contradicts the principles of the idea of the right to the city, by not entitling all of the inhabitants of the city to participation in and appropriation of the city.

The adoption of the principle of "preserving the demographic balance in the city" constitutes one of the central aims of the new outline plan for Jerusalem known as "Jerusalem 2000", whose objectives are projected to be fulfilled by 2020, and which include, for the first time, West and East Jerusalem (Jerusalem Local Outline plan 2000; Report no. 2, Current Status Survey and Analysis of Trends, June 2002, p. 26 This demographic objective and principle is derived from the grand objective of the outline plan, which is "establishing the status and continued development of the city as the capital of the State of Israel, as a center for the Jewish people, and as a city holy to the three monotheistic religions." The "Jerusalem 2000" outline plan states that a demographic balance "according to government decision" is the objective presented by the municipality and adopted in government meetings (950,000 residents), preserving the ratio of 70% Jews versus 30% Arabs (Jerusalem Outline plan 2000: Report 4, chapter 7: 202). The planners, after presenting a demographic analysis based on existing trends and forecasts regarding the city, determine that "it is very reasonable to assume that if the demographic trends of recent years continue without substantial change, the situation in 2020 will be one of approximately 60% of the general population living in the Jewish areas and approximately 40% living in the Arab areas (ibid: 202)(see table 1 below).

### Table no. 1: Distribution of the Demographic Balance between Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem in 1967 & 2002, and Forecast for 2020 (in thousands and in percents)

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<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>197,700</td>
<td>458,600</td>
<td>570,000</td>
<td>111,400 (24.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(74.2%)</td>
<td>(67.4%)</td>
<td>(60%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td>68,600</td>
<td>221,800</td>
<td>380,000</td>
<td>158,200 (71.3%)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(25.8%)</td>
<td>(32.6%)</td>
<td>(40%)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>266,300</td>
<td>680,000</td>
<td>950,000</td>
<td>269,600 (39.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(100%)</td>
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In order to cope with that forecast, the planners propose enlarging the Jewish population, concluding:

"The discussion above leads to the following conclusion: the demographic trends predicted in the various scenarios for 2020 are fundamentally affected by the layout of political, economic, social, and cultural forces, as they have been expressed in practice over the recent years. In order to prevent the occurrence of those scenarios, or worse ones, far-reaching
changes are needed in the way of dealing with the central variables affecting the immigration/emigration balances and the gaps in birth rates, which ultimately create the demographic balance. Those variables include many subjects regarding personal security, employment, housing, education, the quality of the environment, cultural and social life, municipal services, et al. Due to the sensitive and special situation of Jerusalem, the ability to affect the variables is in the hands of the Government of Israel (ibid: 2004; emphasis in original).

The planners of the outline plan were aware of the connection between the borders of the city and the preservation of the demographic balance:

"The Municipal Borders – the forecast relates to the city limits as they are. Future changes in the city limits can affect the demographic balance if other municipalities or other undeveloped territory are added to the territory of the city, or if territory is removed from the city's municipal territory" (ibid: 201).

Examination of the route of the wall shows that it will include undeveloped territory, remove neighborhoods inhabited by Palestinians, add urban Jewish settlements such as Ma'aleh Edumim in the east and Giv'at Ze'ev in the northwest, and create Palestinian enclaves, such as the Bir Nabalah enclave and the Anata enclave. This route for the wall was approved by the government against the opinion of the inhabitants of the city, especially the Palestinians, and thus their basic right to participate in creating their urban space was denied them.

Residency and the “Center of Life” Policy

Israel used the 1952 Law of Entry to Israel and the 1974 Entry to Israel Regulations as “legal” instruments to control the number of Palestinians who reside in the city. This was done through implementing what is called the “Center of Life policy.” Under this policy, anyone is subject to losing his or her right to live in Jerusalem if he or she cannot prove that municipal Jerusalem is his or her “center of life.” That is, every Palestinian resident must pay residence taxes, amongst other taxes, and prove that he/she works and lives within the municipal boundaries and sends his/her children to schools inside Jerusalem in order to prove that Jerusalem is his/her ‘center of life’. The status of resident of Jerusalem provides certain social net and entitlement benefits including health insurance and welfare system.

Prior to 1996 (the year of approval of the law of “Jerusalem as a Center of Life” in the Israeli Knesset), this policy only affected Palestinians who had lived abroad for more than seven years. However, since 1996, it applies just as well to Palestinians who live outside of the Jerusalem municipal boundaries, encompassing those who live in the suburbs of Jerusalem and within the West Bank. Palestinians from East Jerusalem live in these suburbs because of the attractiveness of the availability of land and housing, lower taxes and fewer building restrictions.

Thus, following the promulgation of the above-mentioned law, many Palestinian Jerusalemites who had moved to suburbs and Palestinian cities in the West Bank, lost their right of residence in the city. Since 1967, over 6,500 Palestinians have had their right to reside in East Jerusalem revoked. This has caused thousands of Palestinians, who were unwilling to lose their residency rights, to panic and return to living within the municipal boundaries of East Jerusalem. This has increased neighborhood densities, because many of these Palestinians returned to live with relatives in the same house, or were forced to live in hastily constructed houses without obtaining the required building permits, a process which would have required too much time and money. In 2003 alone, 272 people had their “legal” right to reside in Jerusalem revoked, and 16 in 2004.
Another “legal” policy, which is also meant to control the demographic balance for the benefit of Jewish superiority, is the Israeli government’s decision to put a halt to the process of all “family unification” applications submitted by non-resident spouses in May 2002. In July 2003, the Knesset approved a bill which prevents Palestinians who marry Israeli citizens or Israeli residents from receiving Israeli permanent residency status or citizenship. This new law will turn many Palestinians living in the city with their families into illegal residents. As a consequence, they will be subject to arrest and many may be deported from the city to the West Bank areas.

The Policy of Central Spatial Management and Planning as a Demographic Policy Solution

This demographic and spatial policy is reflected in the spatial planning policy, land designation, and allocation of land for housing (Bimkom, 2006). Marom (2004), who discussed the planning “trap” in East Jerusalem, as expressed in planning policy, land settlement, building permits, and house demolition, stated:

"The attempt to preserve the 'demographic balance' amidst the faster natural growth of the Palestinian population violates accepted planning considerations and distorts them. The 'demographic balance' leads, de facto, to restrictions on building for the Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem" (Marom, 2004: 19; emphasis in original).

The local planning outline plan for the Palestinian neighborhoods, as a programme, is derived from the principle of preserving the "demographic balance". Thus, the scope of territory allocated for the development of housing, public buildings, and for economic use is limited, and no larger than 7.1 percent of the area of municipal jurisdiction, which is 12.7 percent of the area of East Jerusalem, despite the fact that the population there constitutes approximately 33 percent of the inhabitants of the city (Khamaisi, 2006: 79). In addition, despite the fact that Jerusalem is a city, and that the Palestinian population is supposed to be urban in its patterns of behavior (its housing patterns, building rights, and planning direction in the approved outline plans), the Jerusalem 2000 plan actually preserves their rural configuration. Its objectives, therefore, are territorial and demographic, not functional. It appears from analysis of the housing plan for the Arab population that the plan proposes one central tool for solving housing needs: increased density in existing neighborhoods. The data in report No. 4 of the Jerusalem 2000 outline plan shows that for the Jewish population, the outline plan allows for the allocation of 47,000 housing units (real capacity, Report No. 4: 137) and 9,500 dunams for development, whereas for the Arab population the plan allocates 26,000 housing units (real capacity for densification of neighborhoods according to table No. 1, Report No. 4: 139) and approximately 2,300 dunams for development. The inequality is also manifest in a comparison of the allocation of building rights in Jewish neighborhoods and adjacent Arab neighborhoods. The policy of increased density, intended to limit the area designated for Palestinian development, which is also the declared municipal and government policy toward the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, contradicts the planners’ claim regarding the preservation of the present character of the city. In addition, there is no real possibility of densification in most of the areas in which Palestinian inhabitants live, due to the limitations on building rights, building height, and the scarcity of public land (for public buildings and streets), restrictions on private ownership of land and complicated arrangements regarding proof-of-ownership. All the outline plans, including the Jerusalem 2000 outline plan, have been forced top-down, with little participation on the part of the inhabitants, and without adaptation to current socio-cultural and sociopolitical circumstances.
This new master plan is the first statutory plan which has dealt with the city as a single unit since 1949. The main goal of the plan, as stated in its report is “to introduce new modes of thought in planning and an inclusive plan which aims to continue developing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and as a metropolitan center for the benefit of its residents and their quality of life.”

While the master plan does not provide for the allocation of lands or the possibility of creating new neighborhoods for the Palestinians, the detailed plan for the Old City states that new neighborhoods will be built if residents are forced to relocate. The detailed plan also articulates the goal of ending the demographic crowding in the Old City, which is mainly Palestinian, and it discusses developing planning tools for the renovation of Old City residential areas, raising them to sufficient standards. In addition, the plan refers to the need to assemble an administrative organization to enforce rules and regulations in the Old City.

Despite the major effect of the wall on the Palestinians, and the cutting off of some neighborhoods from the city and from the West Bank, the plan totally ignores the existence of the separation wall and its social and economic impact on the city and its surroundings.

With respect to the economy, the plan does not suggest new industrial and employment areas or commercial zones for economic development in the eastern part of the city. It also ignores the enhancement of cultural and institutional activities in the city. At the same time, it does not reveal any intention to develop the public transportation system in East Jerusalem. Although the plan does include the light railway, which passes through (only) one neighborhood in East Jerusalem (Shu'fat), that railway line functions mainly to serve Israelis living in settlements in the north of East Jerusalem.

**Ethno-national Isolation in the Urban Space: Between Achieving Equality and Ending the Occupation**

The legal status of permanent residence, maintenance of the demographic balance, reduction of territory by expropriating land, and limitations through statutory spatial planning, as well as the vague geopolitical future, the alienation, the hostility and the state of conflict between the two populations in Jerusalem, have contributed to the implementation of a policy of separation between the residential spaces of the two populations in the city. The Palestinian Arabs live and congregate in neighborhoods separate from the Israeli Jews, who also live in their own separate neighborhoods. The few attempts by individual, extremist Jews to penetrate into and live in Palestinian residential areas do not change the fact that there is a clear separation in Jerusalem, between neighborhoods which are homogenous in terms of ethno-national and cultural identity (Hasson, 1996). This separation is manifest in the urban landscape, and is clearly noticeable both in housing architecture and in the quality of infrastructure and development. The Arab neighborhoods are based mainly upon self-construction. They developed organically, with no prior planning, despite the fact that approved plans for some of them do exist. They lack public building and initiative on the part of contractors. The Palestinian neighborhoods, excepting the Old City and the development around the Holy Basin, developed from a nucleus of villages. They still preserve their rural style development, although there are also urbanization processes occurring in them. The social, functional, and spatial behavioral patterns of the Palestinian population are based on traditionalism and conservatism. In light of the limitations which Israel has placed on Palestinian national political organization, the Palestinian leadership in Jerusalem has not become entrenched, and national institutions which create national consciousness have not been established. All these, as well as intense Israeli activity intended to decrease the political national links between the Palestinians in Jerusalem and the national Palestinian movement, including the Palestinian Authority, have pushed the Palestinian population inward, toward local, national, social, and religious leadership within separate "village" neighborhoods. The lack of political stability in the Palestinian Authority, the economic crisis,
and the dearth of economic opportunities for the middle and lower class to which most of the Palestinian population in Jerusalem belongs, the spatial separation between the Palestinian neighborhoods, their segmentation and surrounding by Israeli neighborhoods and settlements, as well as the policy of supervision and control employed by the Israeli establishment, present the Jerusalemite Palestinian population with challenges and dilemmas regarding participation in the shaping and appropriation of the public space of life in the city. Refraining from participation is the result of internal and external motivations and barriers. Although the Palestinian population lives in and consumes this space, it is not a partner in its creation and management. Participating in the creation of the urban space under the existing geopolitical conditions of Israeli control and occupation is perceived, by the Palestinians in and out of Jerusalem, as quasi-recognition and legitimization of the Israeli occupation and hegemony. On the other hand, non-participation impedes its ability to acquire resources and to appropriate its public space, or to exercise its right to the city. Centralized Israeli municipal and government policies constitute an additional barrier to the exercising of the right to the city on the part of the Jerusalemite Palestinians.

This dilemma causes the Palestinian population to sway between the attainment of equality, a just distribution of resources among city inhabitants, and claims for fairness in distribution of space. This includes active participation in the creation, design, and management of the space as inhabitants of the city on the one hand, and, on the other hand, their national demand to end the occupation, to be granted Palestinian citizenship and residency by repartitioning the city into two parts — the east Palestinian and the west Israeli. In the eastern part the Palestinians, according to this demand, will be autonomous in controlling power resources and in managing the public space and resources.

Additional factors have contributed to this alternation of views, including geopolitical arrangements and solutions which have been proposed since 1967 until today, the stance of the Palestinian authority and the representatives of the national Palestinian movement, and the lack of international recognition of Israeli control over East Jerusalem (Khamaisi & Nasrallah, 2006). Local attempts and initiatives for participation in the Jerusalem municipal elections and preparing of local outline plans, as in Sur Baher and Isawiyeh, as well as the activity of neighborhood agencies, remain limited attempts, and do not present an alternative for management of the dilemma in which the Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem find themselves.

The erection of the separation wall will exacerbate the dilemma of the Palestinian population, the Israeli government and the Jerusalem Municipality, and the whole Jewish Jerusalemite population. The separation wall will make the Palestinian Jerusalemites' movement and mobility with respect to the rest of the Palestinian territories and to the political and administrative center of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip more difficult and limited. Simultaneously, the State of Israel will apparently limit movement into Israeli areas in West Jerusalem and the rest of Israel. Despite all this, the political status of Palestinian Jerusalemites is not expected to change in the foreseeable future, and will continue to be one of permanent residency. This status differentiates them from the Palestinian Arabs who are citizens and residents of Israel, as well as from the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip who are residents and citizens of the Palestinian Authority, and in the future, perhaps, of the State of Palestine.

The question under discussion involves scenarios regarding the behavior of Palestinian Jerusalemites as a result of the erection of the wall and their growing isolation as a group with a different status, in a sensitive geopolitical, cultural, and spiritual place. Before discussing that question, we shall summarize the implications of the wall for the Palestinian population particularly, and the city in general.
The Separation Wall and its Implications for the Possibility of the Existence of the Right to the City

Studies engaged in identifying and illustrating the implications of the separation wall for the city's population have emphasized its implications for the fabric of life of the Palestinian area in and around Jerusalem, at the metropolitan level. On the one hand these studies have reported on the political implications of the wall, and on the other hand have highlighted the wall's implications for preserving security in Israel. It is the opinion of this author that the significance of the wall has not yet been identified in depth, despite the various reports (Kimchi, 2006; Michael & Ramon, 2004; Brooks, Khamaisi, Nasrallah & Abu Ghazaleh, 2005). The wall is a physical element, partly constituted by an 8 meter high wall, and partly by a fence, spread over an area between 50-80 meters wide. Its length in the Jerusalem area, according to plan, will be approximately 150 km. The total amount of land expropriated for building the wall is 2,680 dunams, and the total area of land made inaccessible to its owners due to the wall is 19,200 dunams (OCHA, 2003: 3). The direct implications of the erection of the wall are as follows: expropriation of land and direct harm to its owners, damage to and marring of the landscape, severing the city of Jerusalem from its metropolitan and surrounding area, and the city gradually receding to a peripheral city or a border city, as it was between the years of 1948-1967. This detachment economically weakens the nucleus of the city. Studies have shown that there is a direct link between the periphery and the core in the metropolitan structure. A strong metropolitan core depends upon a strong and nourishing periphery, and vice versa. Severing the city from its periphery, or supervising access to and from it, will deal a direct blow to the core of the city and its developmental directions. Thus, Jerusalem's natural historical developmental directions on a North-South axis, between Ramallah and Bethlehem, will be forced westward, with an orientation toward the heart of Israel, Tel Aviv. The erection of the wall weakens and even severs natural cultural, functional, economic, and political ties between the Palestinians in Jerusalem and their brethren in adjacent Palestinian villages, towns, and cities, and harms them economically, socially, and psychologically.

The wall passes through neighborhoods inhabited by Palestinians, separates families' space of identification, limits their development, and decreases the real estate value in them (Garb, 2004). On the other hand, it directs the ties between Jerusalem and the Palestinian territories through checkpoints with strict supervision and selection procedures. Without a geopolitical arrangement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, including the determination of the status of the settlements, the Israeli settlers will continue to use the passageways to Jerusalem. Thus, a system of apartheid might develop in the area of the West Bank and at the passageways to Jerusalem. An additional possible implication is that of temporary traders setting up shop adjacent to the passageways outside the wall, and the outbreak of violence against the backdrop of a national and economic struggle. Thus, a change will occur in land uses in the areas around the passages and terminals, and provocations and security problems will occur. Where the wall passes through an inhabited area without a political arrangement, in an area experiencing economic disparities and a national struggle, it will lead to smuggling, infiltration, violence, and other activity on the part of those opposing it. In other words, the area of the wall will be not a tranquil area, rather a security hotspot.

The Israeli supervision of Palestinian mobility, into and out of the emerging political economic center north of Jerusalem in the Ramallah area, forces Palestinians into a dilemma: whether to emigrate to Ramallah or live outside the wall, in an attempt to reduce the suffering of the daily passage, or to detach themselves from work in Ramallah and to look for inferior work opportunities in Jerusalem and in Israel. For the middle class, the upper class, and the educated, opportunities exist in the Ramallah area, and also in Arab and Muslim states which do not maintain relations with Israel. Those opportunities are greater than those existing or likely to develop for them in Jerusalem or Israel. Thus, the wall can be expected to lead to emigration of the educated from Jerusalem to the other side of the wall. On the other hand,
middle and lower class families outside the wall, who have the right to residency in Jerusalem, might abandon their homes outside the wall, wishing to live in Jerusalem. Some of them will return to the Old City, in which living conditions are inferior. These contrary trends harm Jerusalem, and specifically the Palestinian population.

The recent developments in Sheik Sa’ad and the burden placed upon its inhabitants as a result of the erection of the wall adjacent to them, for example, caused more than 500 residents to abandon their homes in that neighborhood and to live in Jerusalem proper. In this regard Sheik Sa’ad – a small neighborhood – is an example of a far wider phenomenon, felt primarily in Jerusalem neighborhoods which the government has decided to exclude from the separation wall (Kafr Aqav, Ras Hamis, the Shuafat refugee camp and the Shalom neighborhood in Anata), as well as in the main Palestinian cities adjacent to Jerusalem, which have always been outside the municipal border (for example, Abu Dis and A Ram). Garb (2004) has already pointed out the widening phenomenon by which many Palestinian Jerusalemites who lived in the peripheral neighborhoods of the city began to "immigrate" back into it as a result of the construction of the separation wall and of the detachment which it imposed between the city and their neighborhoods of residence. There are those who estimate at tens of thousands the total number of Palestinians with Israeli identity cards likely ultimately to settle permanently on the western side of the wall. Mass return to the city on the part of Palestinian Jerusalemites will cause increasing crowding in the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem and a sharp rise in poverty and unemployment, which are already high. Entering the evacuated peripheral neighborhoods will be Palestinians who are not Jerusalemite and do not hold permits to enter Israel. Thus, poverty in East Jerusalem and the Jerusalemite Palestinian metropolis is increasing, the economic situation is deteriorating (with all that entails for the character of the city), the level of crime is on the rise, and stability is becoming further undermined.

A wall which separates Palestinians in Jerusalem from their brethren in the Palestinian Authority, severs their connections, and imposes active supervision over their mobility, presents a challenge for the Israeli government and the Jerusalem Municipality in managing their policy toward the Palestinians: should the inherent discrimination on the part of the establishment be continued, or should steps toward conciliation, integration, and attainment of equality be accelerated? Garb (2004), who accentuated the wall's negative repercussions for the Palestinians, including plummeting values of real estate and the return of Palestinians to Jerusalem after construction of the wall, also demonstrated the challenge of an immediate decision which the Israeli government is facing: to work towards full and equal integration, or towards separation from the entire Palestinian population in Jerusalem.

The unilateral policy of the State of Israel, which mandated the erection of the separation wall and its route, entails further implications, both for the Palestinians living in the city and its environs, and for the Israeli population in Jerusalem and in all of Israel. This article does not intend to expand beyond what has already been said about the implications of the wall; rather, it intends to present the changes and trends which will affect the Palestinian population in Jerusalem, whilst tackling the question of whether the exercise of the ‘right to the city’ will increase, or be denied, as it is today.

The phase for Segments of the Separation Wall in and around Jerusalem

While approval of the first phase of the wall primarily concerned the northwestern West Bank barrier, it also included approval of construction of what Israeli spokespersons have come to call “the Jerusalem Envelope.” The plans initially included a 22-kilometer wall around East Jerusalem comprised of two segments: the first, north of the city in the area extending from the Ofer military base (southwest of Ramallah) to the Qalandiya Checkpoint; the second, south of the city in the area extending from Ras Beit Jala to Deir Salah Village southeast of Jerusalem. Construction of the two segments was completed in July 2003, thereby isolating
Palestinian East Jerusalem from Ramallah in the north and from Bethlehem in the south. The segments also exclude from the city the Samiramis and Kafr Aqab neighborhoods which actually lie within the municipal northern borders of East Jerusalem. The combined population of the two excluded neighborhoods is approximately twelve thousand.

In September 2003 the Israeli security cabinet approved all the segments of the wall in and around Jerusalem. The segments were approved as part of phases three and four of the overall wall/barrier plan for the entire West Bank, and they include a segment from Deir Salah Village southeast of municipal East Jerusalem, running toward the north to Abu Dis and then eastwards toward Al Eizariya. The length of this component is 17 kilometers. This segment isolated from the city the villages of As Sawahira ash Sharqiya, Arab Al Jahalin, and the suburbs Al Eizariya and Abu Dis. The total area of this enclosed area is 14,550 dunums (3,6337 acres) with a population of more than 45,000. The official population is 38,531 but it excludes approximately 7,000 Jerusalemites living there who hold an Israeli residency ID card but live in Al Eizariya.

The fourth segment of 14 kilometers extends from the south of Anata Village toward the northwest and excludes from East Jerusalem the Shu‘fat Refugee Camp and the Ras Khamis and Dahiyat As Salam neighborhoods, all of which are actually located within the municipal borders of the city. This stretch continues northward and toward the northwest and separates the Jerusalem Palestinian suburb of Ar Ram from East Jerusalem before ending at the Qalandiya Checkpoint. This fourth segment will isolate the refugee camp and eastern neighborhoods of approximately twenty-two thousand Palestinians from East Jerusalem; and it will also separate the nine thousand residents of Anata Village from the city. The total area of this enclave is 5,800 dunums (1450 acres). Moreover, the villages of Hizma (population approximately 6,500) and Az Za‘ayyem (2,500) will be completely isolated from their entire surroundings. The same fate will befall the residents of Ar Ram and Dahiyat Al Bareed, with a combined population of 50,000. The official number is 27,452 and does not take into account Jerusalemites with Israeli ID who make up one fourth of the population in Ar Ram area. Nor does it include the many West Bankers from Hebron and Nablus who have moved...
to Ar Ram in the past ten years. These communities will be enclosed by a wall that extends along the east, south and northern area perimeters, converting these suburbs into an isolated island. Previously they were a vital commercial and service center serving East Jerusalem and its relationship with the West Bank. The total area of the enclave is approximately 3,500 dunams (875 acres).

A fifth segment (18 kilometers) of the scheme for isolating East Jerusalem consists of consolidating the city’s suburban villages of Bir Nabala, Al Judeira, Al Jib and Beit Hanina into an isolated enclosed area linked not to East Jerusalem but to Ramallah by a tunnel. The total population of these villages is approximately 28,000 residents, about half of whom carry West Bank identity cards and the remaining half are holders of East Jerusalem identity cards. The Bir Nabala area grew during the period from 1985-2001 to become an important commercial and industrial axis linked to East Jerusalem. This area began losing its importance at the beginning of the Second Intifada (September 2000) when Israel sealed its western entrance leading to the Atarot industrial zone and constructed an alternative road for the use of Israelis (Road No. 45). The total area of this enclave is 10,500 dunums (2630 acres). Another enclave is Al Walaja village, southwest of Jerusalem will be transformed into an isolated area. Part of this village is located within the borders of East Jerusalem; the total area of this enclave is 2,300 dunums (575 acres), with a population of 1,818.

**The Effect of the Wall on East Jerusalem**

The wall has serious demographic, social and economic ramifications that will seriously impact East Jerusalem and its hinterland. The urban space of the city will also be severely affected. In reality, for the Palestinians, Jerusalem is no longer the center of the West Bank; it has become an isolated peripheral city and its neighborhoods have been fragmented by a physical barrier and internally divided along national/ethnic, economic and social group lines. The wall is a unilaterally imposed spatial regime which will:

1. Disrupt East Jerusalem’s role as the hub linking the northern and southern West Bank, transforming the city from a service, commercial, social, and religious center of the West Bank and Gaza into an isolated enclave cut off from the entire Palestinian territories.
2. Create more “facts on the ground”; in this instance, it will change the municipal boundaries of the city by excluding Palestinian neighborhoods and by annexing to West Jerusalem lands of Israeli settlements east, northwest, northeast and southwest of the city. In all, the wall will annex an area of more than 164 square kilometers to Jewish metropolitan Jerusalem. It will strengthen the Israeli continuity at the expense of East Jerusalem's integrity.
3. Change the demographic balance of the population by excluding Palestinian demographic concentrations: 55,000 Palestinian East Jerusalem residents effectively will be removed from the city. More than 130,000 Palestinians living in East Jerusalem suburbs and villages within the Jerusalem Governorate will be directly affected.
4. Separate East Jerusalem from its hinterland, restricting its natural development and its relationship to the surrounding satellite cities and villages. Bethlehem is the clearest example of a city cut from its "mother's city", and it has suffered badly. Bethlehem relied on East Jerusalem services and its economy was totally dependent on East Jerusalem.
5. Cause real harm to the economy and the role of the secondary commercial and industrial centers in the Jerusalem suburbs (such as Al Eizariya, Bir Nabala and Ar Ram), by isolating them from their center city.
6. Divide families on both sides of the wall. This will obviously impact seriously the social life and the family ties between Palestinians, who live on different sides of the
7. Cause severe deterioration in East Jerusalem's economy by isolating it from its supporting surroundings and by denying access and limiting the mobility of people and goods. The wall clearly affects trade and the ability of the city to create an image or conditions that will attract tourists or investors. Ultimately the failed economy will exhaust the residential population and lead to an eventual emigration that will constitute a soft ethnic cleansing.

8. Cause security threats to the Palestinians in residential areas close to the barriers.

9. Reduce the possibility of the birth of a viable and capable Palestinian state enjoying geopolitical contiguity with East Jerusalem as its capital.

Between Isolation and Convergence, and Spatial Partnership: Scenario of Transformation

The challenge which Garb (2004) places before the Israeli government and the Jerusalem Municipality is also the Palestinian population's challenge: should they continue to demand the end of the Israeli occupation and the exercise of their right to the city (as opposed to the occupation), or come to terms with Israel's decision to keep Jerusalem, including its eastern part, as the capital of the State of Israel, in order to realize the grand objective of the "Jerusalem 2000" outline plan? Will the situation of Israeli control over Jerusalem allow the Palestinians to exercise the right to the city? Realization of the goals, the policy, and the operative activity determined in the Jerusalem 2000 outline plan, which are, de facto, the continuation of the existing policy discussed above, puts the Palestinian inhabitants of Jerusalem in an inferior position from the outset, in terms of their political status and economic opportunities, and denies them the right to the city, by the very essence of its demographic definition the decision making structure, and the process of resource distribution controlled by the Israelis.

At the same time, the Palestinian population in Jerusalem is expected to grow as a result of a high natural birth rate, and their return to the city from three different sources: a) the Jerusalemite population living in the Diaspora, including Amman in the Kingdom of Jordan; b) Jerusalem inhabitants who emigrated in the past and lived in cities and villages outside the municipal boundaries of the city which became bulges like the Bir Nabala bulge; c) Jerusalemite Palestinian populations living in the neighborhoods outside of the wall, yet within the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem. Their fear of government decisions which would allow the revocation of their permanent resident status, or "crawling revocation" of their identity cards, encourages them to find housing within the wall. The factors tugging in the direction of positive immigration stem, therefore, from considerations of maintaining a permanent residency, as well as from political stability. The trends of demographic growth among the Palestinians in Jerusalem will intensify the demographic myth in the Israeli public. Israel's goal of preserving the "demographic balance" according to a formula of 70:30 will likely push the Israeli government to employ an active policy against immigration and return of Palestinians, and to legislate statutes and issue by-laws which will approve and formalize the policy of preserving Israeli demographic superiority. In this context, the issue of whether the State of Israel will waive its sovereignty and its annexation of territories and neighborhoods populated by Palestinians which are within the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem, but due to the erection of the wall remained outside of it, will be on the agenda. Those Israelis who support the demographic option will call for, and act toward, an Israeli decision to cede these residents. On the other hand, demands will rise for the entry and return into the city by Palestinians with Israeli identity cards, raising the demand for housing and services, in which the government and the Municipality of Jerusalem are not interested. The great demand for housing, and the limited supply, will lead to a number of trends in the city: a) the prices of housing will soar (construction, purchase, and lease), and poorer families and young couples will fail to solve their housing problems, intensifying the housing
shortage; b) the state of distress will reflect upon the level of neighborhood development. The Palestinian neighborhoods in Jerusalem will deteriorate further, and disparities between them and the Jewish neighborhoods will grow; c) the Old City, its environs, and the village nuclei, which have traditional preservation value, will attract weak families, thus harming their character and turning them into a space which evokes fear and deters visitors and tourists; d) Palestinian middle class families will begin to seek housing in the Jewish neighborhoods proximate to them such as French Hill, East Talpiot, Neveh Ya’akov, and Pisgat Ze’ev, a trend which has already begun to bud. The spill out and penetration process on the part of Palestinian families into neighborhoods which were built as settlements in East Jerusalem will accelerate, encourage emigration on the part of the Jewish population, and intensify the tension between the two populations, especially those of low socioeconomic status. Those who can afford it will seek alternative solutions far from the areas of fear which will develop, and only the weak, who cannot afford to move to new places, will remain. The result will be Jewish emigration from Jerusalem to alternative and available housing in other Israeli cities and towns, a tip-over of the demographic balance, physical and social deterioration of neighborhoods due to penetration of weak populations into them, and tainting the social relationships of some Palestinian families, who will depart from the traditional and conservative settlement framework.

Building restrictions mandated by the Government of Israel and the Municipality of Jerusalem in Palestinian neighborhoods will then likely become stricter. The housing market will be limited due to a lack of public initiative and support to solve the housing problems of the Palestinian population and to supply the demand. The value of land will be high due to a lack of developable land, a direct result of the restrictive and systematic planning policy, and due to the desire of landowners to keep their land for their grandchildren and great-grandchildren, as part of their commitment to the next generations, especially in the current state of national threat. The land market will not function under free market conditions. Intra-familial disputes over land will also worsen, due to multiple owners and changes in traditional behavior patterns. The shortage of land will of course limit the supply, and the price of land will rise, undermining even the ability of the few to purchase land for self-construction or construction by contractor.

The shortage of housing land will be accompanied by a shortage of land for public needs. The planning and development policy for the Palestinian neighborhoods is based upon local demand. There is no supply of land for public urban supra-neighborhood uses. Under current social circumstances, the policy of the Jerusalem Municipality and the Israeli government encourages fragmentation and perpetuates the rural nature and tribal reality, meets cultural willingness among the urbanizing Palestinian population. This is expected to lead to a number of implications: a) a shortage of public space and of employment on the urban level, for which the Palestinian population will use land in Jewish neighborhoods; b) the traditional conservative behavior patterns and the local identification with the neighborhood, the extended family, or the tribe, and the identification with local social-economic or religious leadership, will deepen and will not produce a Palestinian civil society in Jerusalem; c) the demand by the entire Palestinian population to exercise the right to the city will decline, as the geographical division between groups according to neighborhoods, with no transportation system, common employment base, function center, or educational and cultural center to increase the contact between them, will deepen the alienation and estrangement, and decrease civil consolidation.

The rise of individualism, and the desire of individuals to survive, will dull the effect of social-national feedback, and might increase the demand to receive Israeli citizenship instead of permanent residency. Concerns over the political stale-mate, and the blocking of connections with the Palestinian political and financial center due to the wall, will encourage people to consider the Israeli option, in order to ensure opportunities for themselves. Demands for Israeli citizenship are at odds with Israel's policy of preserving the demographic balance, and
reveal a conflict of interests between the central government and the community. In such a situation, the Municipality of Jerusalem stands as the guard at the gate of the state's interest, against the interest of the community.

The Israeli opposition to the Palestinian Jerusalemites' demands to receive citizenship status, or to have Israel concede the space of their neighborhoods for a Palestinian political entity, will turn them into a new interest group within their people. This group will include a Palestinian subgroup with Jordanian citizenship, Israeli permanent residency, and Palestinian consciousness and identity. Erecting the wall will only intensify the conflicts of interests and dilemmas of this group. On the other hand, an Israeli concession of Palestinian neighborhoods on the municipal boundary of Jerusalem, yet beyond the wall, has political implications, and contradicts the Basic Law: Jerusalem the Capital of Israel. The erection of the wall thus raises the issue of citizenship and the geopolitical future of Jerusalem's residents who remain beyond the separation wall. Remaining outside of Jerusalem, under current policy, leads to the expiration of the right of residency. These acts of "crawling" transfer — limiting Palestinian development in Jerusalem, revoking residency because of political identification, preventing the return of refugees, implementing a social demographic policy which encourages forced urbanization leading to a decrease of the Palestinian population in the city—all allow the Government of Israel to preserve the demographic balance, and to continue to deny the inhabitants' right to the city. This is despite the fact that it is the largest city concentrating a large Palestinian minority, expected to constitute about one fifth of the total Palestinian population in Israel. The problems of the Palestinian inhabitants of Jerusalem will be added to those plaguing the Arab population in Israel.

Summary and Conclusion

The unilateral erection of the separation wall on the part of Israel, in the absence of a geopolitical arrangement with the Palestinians or other interested parties in the Arab world and international community, escalates the confrontation over the city and harms the fabric of life within it. The very fact of a continuing national struggle in the city denies the inhabitants their right to the city. Each ethno-national group identifies with the national struggle of the state to which it belongs. The residents sacrifice their right to the city, succumbing to a national policy which will directly determine the fabric of life in the city. The national struggle and the majority's control over positions of power, resources, and accessibility to them, do not contribute to civil equality, and frustrate the possibility of distributive justice in the city between the citizens and between national groups. The national policy aspiring to ensure control over the city denies the minority the right of participation in decision-making regarding the shaping of the urban space, its creation, and its appropriation, and perpetuates Israeli control over affairs in the city and the fabric of life within it. The erection of the separation wall exacerbates the Palestinians' inability to exercise their right to the city. In the foreseeable future, the central government's policy of determining the arrangements in the city of Jerusalem will continue.

The State of Israel declares that the erection of the wall stemmed from and serves security motivations, until such time as a geopolitical arrangement is reached between the Palestinians and the Israelis. Clearly, however, the wall's route testifies to ethno-demographic and geopolitical considerations. In the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, temporary borders have often been created which over time became permanent. The separation wall appears not only temporarily to buffer, but also potentially to determine an international border, just as the originally temporary security arrangements that created the Green Line as determined in the ceasefire agreements eventually came to determine an international border between Israel and Palestine. That is the nature of temporary borders: they become permanent and change the political orientation and status of the population, as
well as the fabric of life within it. The Palestinian Arabs in Israel have acquired a political consciousness which is different from that which guided those who were annexed to Jordan and Egypt between 1948 and 1967. Over a period of 19 years, in villages which were split along the ceasefire line – the Green Line – like Barta’a (Kabha, 2005) or Beit Tsafafa, two groups of different status, political orientation, and identification evolved. The conquering of East Jerusalem, its annexation, and the granting of permanent resident status to Palestinians in Jerusalem, turned them as well into a group differentiated and set apart from the rest of the Palestinian population. One knows not when a geopolitical arrangement will be reached in Jerusalem. In the meantime, a Palestinian-Israeli adoption of the idea of the right to the city may spark a turning point in the conflict, and lead to a search for common interests, and for their reinforcement, for the welfare of all the inhabitants of that city, which is important to everyone.

Israel continues to control more than two-thirds of the territory of the West Bank. It grants freedom of movement to Israeli settlers in the area, without supervision by the Palestinian Authority whose roles were defined by the Oslo accords in areas "A" and "B", and is creating a system of apartheid in the West Bank. The concern is that if the Palestinians are not allowed to exercise the right to the city in Jerusalem, a system of apartheid will penetrate it as well. The challenge facing the Government of Israel today is to decide whether or not to reach a geopolitical arrangement which will allow the Palestinians to exercise their right to the city, either separately from, or together with Israel. This decision should not be put off until a time when it will exact a greater price, when violence, which threatens security, development, and the future of Jerusalem, will frustrate it; and the sooner - the better.

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* This paper based on research on the separation wall which I do with others in IPCC, Jerusalem. Part of this research will be published in book edited by Hasson, S. (2007) titled


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